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THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN COMPLIANCE
Jennifer M. Pacella*
Abstract: The field of compliance has exploded in interest, attention, and growth over
recent years. It has emerged as a popular career path for those trained in the law, giving rise to
an influx of job opportunities for new law school graduates and seasoned attorneys alike.
Additionally, compliance has tightened the essential interplay between business and law.
Numerous compliance officers hold J.D. degrees and many also serve simultaneously as both
an organization’s chief compliance officer and general counsel, thereby muddying the lines
between which service constitutes the “practice of law,” requiring adherence to professional
rules of responsibility, or non-legal work, where such rules would typically not be applicable.
This Article will analyze these important distinctions, as well as the lack of regulatory guidance
for lawyers in the compliance function, by viewing the discussion largely through the lens of
an often-unnoticed ethical rule—the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 5.7—which
requires lawyers to comply with the full range of professional conduct rules even when they
are providing a non-legal “law-related service.” This Article will argue that the compliance
function is a near-precise fit for this rule and will propose reform to the current regulatory
model to ensure that the interests of lawyers, as well as the recipients of their services, are
protected to the most fruitful extent possible in today’s compliance-driven era. While placing
this examination in the context of current scholarly debate that challenges traditional “zealous
advocate” models of attorney representation, this Article will claim that, without adequate and
clear regulatory reform to establish guidelines for behavior, lawyers in compliance functions
risk heightened personal liability due to potential ethical violations from their respective
jurisdictions of admission.
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INTRODUCTION
The new era of heightened regulation in which we live has given rise
to a compliance boom. The need for entities to navigate the complexities
of regulation in their respective industries has established the field of
compliance as its own distinct discipline and has thrust the role of
compliance officers to the forefront, which, in turn, has garnered
significant attention from the entire legal profession, including both legal
scholars and practitioners.1 Lawyers play a crucial role in the compliance
function as experts in interpreting and analyzing legal mandates, rules,
and statutes, thereby rendering skills that add significant value across a
wide range of industries.2
While the position of compliance officer does not require a law degree
or license, it is often the case that a lawyer holds this role.3 According to
surveys documenting the issue, the general counsel serves simultaneously
1. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into Competitive
Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 338 (2017) (noting that a “growing array of regulatory mandates
and modes of regulatory enforcement” has contributed to compliance as a significant area of focus
for legal and business activity and academic and industry-related interest); Veronica
Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2017) (“Compliance
is king, and its subjects—regulators, prosecutors, courts, corporations, and academics—are quick to
tout its power and potential for good.”); Teresa Meek, In A Risky World, Chief Compliance Officers
Move To Center Stage, FORBES (May 31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adp/2017/05/31/in-arisky-world-chief-compliance-officers-move-to-center-stage/ [https://perma.cc/CKL2-7NRN]
(discussing how the “steady rise in regulations” has given way to Chief Compliance Officers playing
crucial roles in companies and industries of all types).
2. See Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs and Corporate SelfPolicing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1113 (1997) (noting that the familiarity of lawyers with legal standards will
allow them to add value to the creation of the criteria and strategies used in an entity’s compliance
monitoring system); Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First-Century Legal Profession,
63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 1270 (2014) (stating that possession of a law license for a compliance officer,
which “signal[s] legal knowledge and experience” is a valuable component of the hiring process).
3. See, e.g., Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1245
(2017) (“The optimal skill set [of a compliance officer] naturally skews personnel toward lawyers.
For high-level compliance positions the trend is even more pronounced. Top compliance officers at
major corporations are often not just attorneys, but many are former prosecutors and regulatory
agents.”); Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New
Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 481 (2008) (discussing the heightened role of
attorneys in compliance functions).
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as chief compliance officer in forty-eight percent of companies.4 While it
has been historically more common for a joint general counsel/chief
compliance officer role to exist in smaller entities, data has revealed that
this duplicate role also commonly emerges in entities that are larger in
size.5 Within in-house counsel departments, an additional survey revealed
that forty-one percent of in-house counsel reported that managing
compliance or regulatory issues is the “greatest priority” for their legal
teams over the next year.6 In addition, numerous non-practicing lawyers
(not simultaneously engaged in the general counsel function) have found
employment in compliance departments, either working as compliance
officers or as part of a compliance team. 7 This considerable influx of
lawyers in the compliance function is illustrative of the evolution of
lawyer roles over recent years, continuously shifting from what was once
predominately a law firm or litigation-based practice to “quasi-legal”
settings at the intersection of both business and law in which legal
expertise, while desirable, is not required.8
4. Jamie Saine, Should General Counsels also be Chief Compliance Officers?, CONVERCENT (July
13, 2015), https://www.convercent.com/blog/should-general-counsels-also-be-chief-complianceofficers [https://perma.cc/6K8F-2GVH] (citing a PwC State of Compliance survey); see also Kathleen
M. Boozang, The New Relators: In-House Counsel and Compliance Officers, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE
SCI. L. 16, 36 (2012) (noting that compliance officers are often also attorneys); José A. Tabuena &
Jennifer L. Smith, The Chief Compliance Officer Versus the General Counsel: Friends or Foes?, 8 J.
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 23, 23 (2006) (noting that, in many organizations, the general counsel
also serves as the chief compliance officer).
5. Tabuena & Smith, supra note 4, at 23; see also Amy E. Hutchens, Wearing Two Hats: In House
Counsel and Compliance Officer, 29 ACC DOCKET 66, 67 (2011) (“Many in-house counsel wear
‘two hats’ [and also serve as compliance officers].”).
6 . Compliance Top Challenge for Legal Departments in 2018, Say 41 Percent Of Lawyers
Surveyed, ROBERT HALF LEGAL (Jan. 24, 2018), http://rh-us.mediaroom.com/2018-01-24Compliance-Top-Challenge-For-Legal-Departments-In-2018-Say-41-Percent-Of-Lawyers-Surveyed
[https://perma.cc/SUP8-YN8G].
7. See, e.g., Detailed Analysis of JD Advantage Jobs, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (May
2013), https://www.nalp.org/jd_advantage_jobs_detail_may2013 [https://perma.cc/LF9H-E3KU]
[hereinafter JD Advantage Jobs, NALP] (noting the prevalence of jobs for law school graduates since
2011 that do not constitute the practice of law but for which a J.D. is preferred and including
compliance work as within that category—such jobs have most commonly occurred within “the
business realm, which accounted for 46% of the JD Advantage jobs obtained by the Class of 2011”);
Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Training the Heads, Hands and Hearts of Tomorrow’s Lawyers: A Problem
Solving Approach, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 103, 141 (2013) (noting the prevalence of law graduates
finding work as compliance officers where a J.D. is not required).
8. See, e.g., Remus, supra note 2, at 1245 (discussing the growing prevalence of lawyers in “quasilegal” roles); Jon M. Garon, Legal Education in Disruption: The Headwinds and Tailwinds of
Technology, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1165, 1225 (2013) (acknowledging that “much of [a lawyer’s]
specialized work has moved out of the traditional practice of law into the various new fields requiring
legal accountability as part of a broader statutory compliance regimen.”); Michele DeStefano,
Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the Borders of Lawyers’ Monopoly and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2962 (2014) (noting that an increasing number of
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Given these developments, numerous normative questions have
emerged that prompt the need to define more closely how lawyers in this
space should be regulated in light of their professional obligations.
Scholarly and regulatory attention on this very issue has been minimal.
Existing regulatory models that govern the conduct of lawyers, whether
practicing law or not, have not kept pace with these recent shifts in the
legal profession, thereby “remain[ing] fixed—structured around the
fiction of crisp and clear boundaries between law and business.” 9 It is
incumbent upon the entities that regulate the professional conduct of
attorneys to adequately respond to this shift.
While numerous law schools have proactively responded by creating
courses, concentrations, certificate programs, or centers devoted to the
compliance field,10 the American Bar Association (ABA) has published a
non-binding “deskbook” to serve as a user-friendly guide helping
“compliance professionals to better understand the regulatory and
enforcement landscapes in which they operate.”11 The targeted audience
of this book is “the present-day compliance officer” and the content is
largely a substance-rich summary of compliance-related laws and
regulations across various industries, including corporate and financial,
healthcare, environmental, and data security, rather than a guide to the
regulation of professional conduct.12 The book does not address the extent
to which, if at all, compliance officers must adhere to the professional
rules of conduct that govern lawyers but seems to imply that such persons

lawyers are moving into such “quasi-legal jobs, where a legal license is not required but having a law
degree provides an advantage.”).
9. Remus, supra note 2, at 1245.
10. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Teaching Compliance, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 399, 399–400 (2016)
(noting the “supply side response” of law schools to the increased hiring of lawyers in the compliance
field, including the development of compliance certificates or degrees); Mikhail Reider-Gordon &
Elena Helmer, Training the Next Generation of Anti-Corruption Enforcers: International AntiCorruption Curriculum in U.S. Law Schools, 14 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169, 179 (2015) (discussing the
efforts of several law schools in creating compliance-based curriculum); Julie DiMauro, U.S.
Compliance Education Expands As Demand Increases – Part One: Law Schools, REUTERS (Dec. 3,
2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2014/12/03/u-s-compliance-educationexpands-as-demand-increases-part-one-law-schools/ [https://perma.cc/9283-76A8] (discussing the
efforts of law schools in developing compliance curriculum in response to the uptick in jobs in this
sector).
11. ABA Compliance Officer’s Deskbook, American Bar Association, https://www.americanba
r.org/products/inv/book/339179898/ [https://perma.cc/3Q32-LVR5]; Andrew S. Boutros, T.
Marcus Funk & James T. O’Reilly, The ABA Compliance Officer’s Deskbook (A.B.A. 2016), New
ABA Comprehensive Guide Helps Compliance Officers to Understand and Manage Risk, A.B.A.
(June 8, 2017) [hereinafter Compliance Officer’s Deskbook].
12. Id. at iii, vi. The authors each have extensive experience as either compliance officers or
prosecutors for compliance failures.
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may not be operating as practicing attorneys as they conduct their work.
That is especially evident in the chapter on “Preserving Legal Privilege,”
in which it is noted that “lawyers who serve as their company’s
compliance officer will expect that their communications about risk are
privileged, but the nuances of that protection are not automatically granted
to the corporate official whose assigned task is designated as ‘compliance’
rather than ‘legal’ officer.”13 The chapter proceeds to note that privilege
“for the work of the [chief compliance officer] extends to confidential
information given for the purpose of obtaining legal representation.” 14
However, no further analysis is offered as to which elements of a
compliance officer’s work, if any, would constitute legal representation
and trigger application of the rules of professional conduct.
In addition, the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) offer no similar guidance. Yet upon close examination of all of the
existing Model Rules, Rule 5.7 stands out as the most on point in this
context. This rule requires adherence to the full rules of professional
conduct when a lawyer is rendering “law-related services,” which is
defined, in part, as those “that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice
of law when provided by a nonlawyer,” as opposed to “legal services.”15
The commentary to Rule 5.7 enumerates many examples of various types
of “law-related services,” including, non-exhaustively, financial planning,
legislative lobbying, accounting, social work, providing title insurance,
and patent, medical or environmental consulting. 16 However, the
compliance function is not mentioned at all here, despite its fitting
application to this particular rule.17 Aside from not capturing compliance
work, the current language of the rule fails to provide guidance as to
navigating the very murky boundaries between legal representation and
the monitoring, surveillance, and preventative measures that are typically

13. Id. at 124.
14. Id. at 126 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 (1976)).
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). Rule 5.7 reads as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with respect to the provision
of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided: (1)
by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer’s provision of legal services
to clients; or (2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with
others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the lawrelated services knows that the services are not legal services and that the protections of the
client-lawyer relationship do not exist. (b) The term ‘law-related services’ denotes services that
might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provision
of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by
a nonlawyer.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7. cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
17. See id.
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descriptive of a compliance officer’s duties.18
Given this absence of regulatory guidance, the legal profession
currently lacks clarity as to the extent to which lawyers who are also
compliance officers must adhere to the full spectrum of professional rules
that govern typical attorney-client relationships. This lack of clarity, in
turn, leads to the potential for confusion and a risk of personal liability
through disciplinary action or sanctions from their respective jurisdictions
for non-adherence to the rules. At the same time, compliance officers face
added pressures from governmental regulators, given that numerous
regulatory agencies have become increasingly active in imposing personal
liability on compliance officers for the violations of their organizations.19
As a result, a lawyer’s overall risk of personal liability when providing
compliance services is considerable.
This Article will focus on lawyers, in possession of a J.D. and admitted
to a state bar, who are rendering services as compliance officers or within
compliance departments and not simultaneously serving as general
counsel. It will propose reform to the regulatory model that currently
governs such individuals as a means of mitigating their risk of liability.
While the limitations of Rule 5.7 have been previously examined in the
context of lawyers engaged in government roles,20 this Article is the first
attempt to tackle this dilemma from the specific lens of the rule’s
applicability to the compliance function. It will proceed in four parts.
Part I will examine the prevalence of lawyers in compliance and will
challenge the organized bar’s historical focus on traditional, litigationbased practice, thereby failing to capture the modern-day panoply of work
in which a law-trained individual might engage, such as compliance.
Part II will closely examine the current Rule 5.7 and provide a
comparative analysis of the results of the author’s state-by-state
comparison of each jurisdiction’s adoption or non-adoption of this rule.
18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also James A.
Fanto, Advising Compliance in Financial Firms: A New Mission for the Legal Academy, 8 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 3–4 (2013) (discussing how compliance officers are essential to an entity’s
oversight or control functions and work closely with regulators to be the “eyes and ears of the firm”).
19. Brian L. Rubin & Irene A. Firippis, Compliance Wars: SEC and FINRA Disciplinary Actions
Against Chief Compliance Officers and In-House Counsel in a Galaxy Not Too Far Away, PRAC.
COMPLIANCE & RISK MGMT. SEC. INDUSTRY, (July–Dec. 2014), https://us.evershedssutherland.com/portalresource/Compliance-Wars_SEC-and-FINRA-Disciplinary-Actions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Q26-68AV] (discussing the significant increase in cases brought by the SEC and
FINRA against compliance officers since 2014).
20. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Model Rule 5.7 and Lawyers in Government Jobs—How Can They Ever
Be “Non-Lawyers”?, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45 (2017) (presenting a robust discussion of the
shortcomings of Rule 5.7 as it pertains to the governance of lawyers in policy or management roles
in government positions).
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The author has found that, to date, fifteen of the fifty states have not
adopted Rule 5.721 and the remaining thirty-five states have not uniformly
conformed their rule to the ABA version.22 The author will argue that
while the compliance function is not likely to be considered the “practice
of law,” it constitutes a “law-related service” that would mandate
adherence to Rule 5.7. Part III will discuss the various personal liability
concerns of lawyers in compliance roles that would stem from adherence
to all of the professional rules of conduct due to Rule 5.7 and the general
tensions that emerge between the legal and compliance functions in an
organizational setting. Finally, Part IV will propose reform to Rule 5.7 to
better address the vulnerable position of compliance officers who provide
non-legal services across various industries.
I.

THE COMPLIANCE BOOM

A.

Influx of Lawyers in Compliance

The field of compliance was once a “a virtually unknown topic”23 and “not
traditionally the exclusive domain of lawyers,”24 but has since emerged as
one of the most vibrant sources of employment and research for the legal field
as a whole. Two decades ago, compliance could be described as “a bit of a
backwater,” as a field that was not particularly specialized and did not
necessarily attract individuals of any particular skillset—“[c]ompliance
officers tended to work in cubicles and performed a sort of glorified
bookkeeping task, making sure that forms were filled out and boxes
checked.” 25 Today, the landscape is extremely different, as the field of
compliance and the role of the compliance officer now boast better salaries,
expansive and collaborative departments, increased prestige, and provide
insight on crucial and strategic decisions of an organization.26 Compliance
departments play a crucial role in organizations through their preventative
21. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; CONN. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT; HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; KY. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT; LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; MONT.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; NEV. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT;
OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; VA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT; WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT. All of these lack some version of Model Rule 5.7.
22. See infra section III.B.
23. Geoffrey P. Miller, Compliance: Past, Present and Future, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 437, 437 (2017).
24. Fanto, supra note 18, at 17.
25. Miller, supra note 23, at 437.
26. Id. at 438–39 (“While there is still some of the check-the-box quality to the compliance
function—and there always will be—the job of compliance has increasingly moved away from a
mechanical approach to a risk-based approach.”).
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focus. Although “compliance” is often subject to varying definitions, 27
one succinct way to describe it is as “a field that focuses on prospectively
ensuring adherence to laws and regulations through the use of monitoring,
policies, and other internal controls.”28
The growth of the compliance function has come about largely as a
response to the extraordinary complexity in regulation over recent
decades, and has increased in attention with the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s amendment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1991
to include the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG).29 The OSG
are based on a “carrots and sticks” model, with the carrot being a
significantly reduced fine for organizations that adopt effective
compliance programs and the stick being the placement of the
organization on probation without any reduced penalty if compliance
programs are not adopted.30 To obtain the carrot of a significantly reduced
fine, the OSG lists several steps for a court to consider when determining
the effectiveness of a compliance program, which include: procedures for
reducing the risk of criminal activity; oversight by high-level individuals;
limited discretionary authority granted to any individual likely to be
criminally active; communication of the program to all employees; the use
of monitoring, auditing, and reporting systems; and disciplinary action for
any violations of the program.31 These steps were intentionally adopted in
a general tone to allow organizations some flexibility in tailoring a
compliance program specific to their needs.32
27. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2075, 2086, 2092–93 (2016) (noting that the definition of compliance has multiple interpretations but
common themes exist to describe the field and what constitutes “effective” compliance).
28. Eric C. Chaffee, Creating Compliance: Exploring A Maturing Industry, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 429, 429
(2017) (noting also that “[n]ow is a watershed period for the compliance industry.”); see also GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 137 (Wolters Kluwer, ed.,
2017) (defining compliance as “a form of internalized norm enforcement within organizations”).
29. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Stephen K. Park, Organic Corporate Governance, 59 B.C. L. REV.
21, 45 (2018) (stating that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are one of the most notable examples
of federal laws that prompt companies to invest in compliance); David Hess, Ethical Infrastructure
and Evidence-Based Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the
Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 317, 318 (2016) (discussing how the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines “ushered in a new era for corporate compliance programs”); Susan L. Martin, Compliance
Officers: More Jobs, More Responsibility, More Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
169, 172 (2015) (noting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 first created corporate compliance
and ethics programs and the compliance officer position).
30. Hess, supra note 29, at 327.
31 . U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(1) (2012) (noting the reduction of
culpability in sentencing if the criminal offense occurred when the organization had in effect an
“effective compliance and ethics program”); see also Hess, supra note 29, at 327–28 (explaining these
seven steps).
32. Hess, supra note 29, at 327–28.
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The focus on compliance has continued steadily since 1991 and was
enhanced in the wake of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 and the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010.33 Even prior to Dodd-Frank, new
regulatory models governing organizations and businesses were
beginning to emerge that laid the groundwork for compliance racing to
the forefront. The post Enron-era and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (“SOX”) helped further facilitate a tangible move away from
traditional, top-down, “command and control” government-dictated
regulatory schemes to “new governance” models focused on selfregulation, self-reporting to government, preventative practices, and
generally more collaboration between regulated entities and regulators.34
New governance models reflect the collective recognition from regulators
and public and private entities that the traditional style of top-down
governance, which addresses problems reactively rather than
preemptively and proactively, was not effective in avoiding large-scale
fraud and other violations of the law. 35 This recognition prompted the
need for heightened collaboration among the government, governed
entities, and other non-state actors. 36 The modern-day compliance
function can be said to be largely descriptive of new governance models,
specifically given its emphasis on the development of policies, programs,
33. See Fanto, supra note 18, at 14 (noting that the Dodd-Frank Act has prompted an increase in
the work of compliance officers); MILLER, supra note 28, at 137–39 (discussing landmarks in the
history of compliance).
34. See, e.g., Bird & Park, supra note 1, at 316–17 (referring to new governance models as
“Collaborative Regulation”); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance in the Teeth of Human Frailty:
Lessons from Financial Regulation, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 441, 456 n.54 (2010) (discussing the postEnron concerns that U.S. GAAP rules “were too rules-based,” as opposed to principles-based, which
is more descriptive of “new governance”); Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation
Protections for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON REG.
491, 499 (discussing the more centralized governance systems in place prior to Enron); Troy A.
Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate
Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 744 n.271 (2005) (explaining that SOX brought about
various “new governance and disclosure practices”).
35 . See, e.g., Michael B. Runnels & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Cooperative NRDA & New
Governance: Getting to Restoration in the Hudson River, the Gulf of Mexico, and Beyond, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 107, 114 (2011) (describing “new governance” approaches as fostering transparency and
accountability and approaching corporate decision-making as a collaborative, non-adversarial process).
36. See, e.g., On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs
Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2127 (2008) (describing new governance approaches as
those that promote self-regulation and government-industry cooperation and enhance problem
solving); Burkard Eberlein, Kenneth W. Abbott, Julia Black, Errol Meidinger & Stepan Wood,
Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8
REG. & GOVERNANCE 3, 10 (2014) (discussing transnational business governance and its importance
in regulating business conduct through a hybrid of public and private institutions and the place of
regulatory governance in this space).
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and procedures aimed at detecting red flags and possible and known
violations of the law, as well as maintaining focus on self-regulation and
self-reporting.37 In this way, the compliance function’s focus is internal,
rather than external, thereby encouraging entities to avoid violations
altogether, rather than facing government investigation or litigation at a
later point. Given that all entities “exist within a nexus of legal, regulatory,
and social norms,” compliance may broadly comprise the ways in which
entities “adapt their behavior to these constraints [or] . . . the set of
internal processes used by firms to adapt behavior to applicable norms.”38
Compliance officers also commonly establish ethics programs to facilitate
adherence to laws and take responsibility for the day-to-day
implementation and effectiveness of such programs.39
Despite the potential for variation in the everyday duties of compliance
officers across the board, their core function is to interpret, assess, and
facilitate the organization’s adherence to the regulations to which it is
subject, and to offer advice about such regulations and other pertinent
laws and the repercussions of non-compliance, all of which are fitting
characteristics of legally trained individuals. 40 Individuals of varied
backgrounds and skills may be qualified to work in the compliance field
but, as many scholars have noted, a lawyer brings a uniquely
advantageous set of skills to the table and many organizations prefer that
a lawyer hold the position of compliance officer given their special legal
training. 41 Lawyers in compliance roles advise entities on conforming
behavior to the complex regulatory climate and often make predictions as
to how a possible adjudicator would evaluate the entity’s compliance
37 . See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 28 (2008) (“In the compliance context, New Governance permits a
dynamic and continually reevaluated internal understanding of compliance.”).
38. Griffith, supra note 27, at 2082.
39. Id. at 2083 (“[T]he compliance function effectively assumes general responsibility for business
conduct consistent with social norms.”); Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson,
«Monitoring» Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health
Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 108 (2009) (noting that while “acceptance of corporate ethics and
compliance programs ultimately depends upon top-down communications,” compliance officers are
tasked with the duty of ensuring the daily success of such programs).
40. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2990 (noting that, on the other hand, some of the skills needed for
compliance officers, such as project management, technology, and training, may not be traditionally
taught in law school).
41. See Ray W. Campbell, The End of Law Schools: Legal Education in the Era of Legal Service
Businesses, 85 MISS. L.J. 1, 6 (2016) (noting that services once dominated by lawyers “are being
delivered by non-lawyer organizations with other important skill sets”); William W. Horton, When
Two Worlds Collide: Ethics Challenges in the Compliance Officer-General Counsel Relationship,
JONES WALKER LLP (Dec. 2015), https://kipdf.com/queue/when-two-worlds-collide-ethicschallenges-in-the-compliance-officer-general-coun_5acbb1197f8b9aeb918b45a8.html
[https://perma.cc/AEV2-Z4AW].
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function, thereby offering judgment based on their distinct education and
expertise. 42 A legal education and/or familiarity and experience with
reading, interpreting, and applying rules, regulations, and statutes has
spurred the exponential growth of law students and attorneys to choose
compliance as a career path.43
The uptick in lawyers holding compliance positions coincided with an
era in which traditional employment prospects for new law school
graduates were at an all-time low largely due to the financial crisis, 44
thereby opening up a wave of “J.D. Advantage” or quasi-legal career
options in which neither a law degree nor bar passage is required, but is
desired. 45 Currently, compliance positions across various industries
comprise one of the largest portions of J.D. Advantage jobs. 46 J.D.
Advantage jobs reflect “the porousness of legal practice,” resulting in
numerous employment opportunities for legally-trained persons in
42. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401,
1440 (2017) (“The lawyer may go beyond a yes or no answer and suggest creative ways that a client
could alter behavior to increase the likelihood that the adjudicator would find the client
in compliance.”).
43 . See, e.g., Haugh, supra note 3, at 1245 (discussing that lawyers have the optimal skills
necessary to act as compliance officers); Chaffee, supra note 28, at 435 (noting that the legal academy
is well-poised to train and contribute to the maturation of the compliance industry); Fanto, supra note
18, at 16–17 (discussing the potential contributions of the legal academy to the compliance field);
Sokol, supra note 10, at 399 (noting that compliance is a “JD plus” job where a legal background is
an advantage to the field).
44. See, e.g., Bernard A. Burk, What’s New About the New Normal: The Evolving Market for New
Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2014) (discussing the “dark and
depressing ‘New Normal’” that the practice of law since the economic downturn may forever be
different); Felix B. Chang, Foreword, Rethinking Compliance, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 371, 371–72 (2016)
(noting that the financial crisis has profoundly changed the landscape of legal employment for lawyers
and has created “a concomitant surge of ‘JD plus’ jobs in corporate compliance,” to which law schools
have responded by establishing courses in the field for law students); Eric C. Chaffee, Answering the
Call to Reinvent Legal Education: The Need to Incorporate Practical Business and Transactional
Skills Training into the Curricula of America’s Law Schools, 20 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 136
(discussing the struggles of law school graduates to find employment in the post financial crisis era
and to be paid at rates on par with what was standard prior to the crisis).
45. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 44, at 371–72 (discussing the onset of “JD plus” jobs after the
financial crisis); JD Advantage Jobs, NALP, supra note 7 (noting that the term “JD Advantage”
became a “new term of art” starting with the law school graduating class of 2011); Hillary Mantis,
What is a J.D. Advantage Career?, NAT’L JURIST (Dec. 3, 2015, 12:50 PM),
http://www.nationaljurist.com/national-jurist-magazine/what-jd-advantage-career
[https://perma.cc/8AVM-B5JN] (explaining that not only is this development due to difficulty in
securing traditional legal jobs, but also due to “the long term desire of many recent law grads to go
into alternative legal careers”).
46 . JD Advantage Jobs, NALP, supra note 7 (aside from compliance positions, other J.D.
Advantage positions have included work as an alternative dispute resolution specialist, a government
regulatory analyst, or investment banking or consulting work); see also Nancy Moore, The Future of
Law as a Profession, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 255, 263 (2017) (noting the increased presence of lawyers in
quasi-legal jobs like compliance officers or “law consultant” jobs).
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various areas of “law and law-related services shared by lawyers and
others.” 47 These expansions in compliance are not limited to any
particular industry, as rapid growth in compliance jobs has run the gamut
from financial institutions to non-governmental organizations. 48 As a
result, while law students have traditionally pursued either a litigation or
a transactional track in their studies, they are now increasingly
discovering a third option—that of a compliance officer or
compliance attorney.49
B.

The Role of Lawyers in Compliance

The popularity of compliance as a career choice for lawyers reflects the
changing realities of the profession over recent decades. Traditionally,
“zealous advocate” served as the sole description of a lawyer’s duties,
comprising such characteristics as undivided loyalty to client, disregard
for “all hazards and costs to other persons” in fulfilling that duty, and a
completely client-centered focus.50 While the zealous advocate model is
most apt for a “one-to-one attorney-client relationship” engaged in
litigation, 51 it is not a fitting description for organizational lawyers
working in modern-day compliance roles. The passage of SOX was
instrumental in furthering this change. SOX implemented mandatory
attorney-reporting duties due to a collective recognition that the
47. Judith A. McMorrow, Moving from a Brandeis Brief to a Brandeis Law Firm: Challenges and
Opportunities for Holistic Legal Services in the United States, 33 TOURO L. REV. 259, 260
(2017) (emphasis added).
48. Mikhail Reider-Gordon & Elena Helmer, Training the Next Generation of Anti-Corruption
Enforcers: International Anti-Corruption Curriculum in U.S. Law Schools, 14 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 169,
175 (2015) (noting that, in 2013, J.P. Morgan Chase announced plans to spend an additional $1.5
billion to create 5,000 new positions in compliance area, constituting a 30% increase in risk-control
staffing and that even non-governmental organizations have been active in developing
compliance programs).
49. David A. Mata, The New Career Choice: The Compliance Attorney, NAT’L JURIST (Feb. 1,
2018, 3:33 PM), http://www.nationaljurist.com/lawyer-statesman/new-career-choice-complianceattorney [https://perma.cc/ZW6G-KC82].
50. MILLER, supra note 28, at 297 (citing distinguished British Attorney, Lord Brougham, from
1821 for “what is still the best-known justification of the lawyer’s role as zealous advocate.”
Brougham went on to state “[s]eparating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate, [the attorney]
must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country
in confusion.”); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for Social Change: What’s A Lawyer to Do?,
5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 201, 217 (1999) (noting that while the “zealous advocate” role traditionally
describes the role of an attorney in an adversary system, lawyers must represent their clients “within
the bounds of the law”).
51. Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV.
147, 216–17 (2000); see also Lori D. Johnson, The Ethics of Non-Traditional Contract Drafting, 84
U. CIN. L. REV. 595, 605–06 (2016) (noting that the “zealous advocate” role is not appropriate for
modern transactional attorneys).
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“executives and accountants [at Enron] [did] not work alone” but were
guided by the lawyers “always there looking over their shoulder.”52 As a
result, Congress included in SOX a provision requiring the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to establish “minimum standards of
professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
[SEC]” when they represent issuer clients.53 The SEC promulgated these
“Part 205 Rules” (as they have come to be known) in 2003, which state
that if attorneys become aware of evidence of material violations of the
law by the issuer or an officer, director, employee, or agent thereof, they
are required to report this evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer
(CLO) or the CLO and chief executive officer (CEO) together.54 If the
attorney reasonably believes that the CLO and CEO have not adequately
responded to the report, the attorney is then required to report the matter
up-the-ladder to the board of directors.55 Failure to report in this manner
results in SEC-imposed civil penalties.56
Attorneys also have a permissive disclosure option in which they may
opt to externally report confidential client information to the SEC if they
reasonably believe doing so is necessary to prevent substantial financial
injury to the organization and its investors.57 By requiring lawyers to blow
the whistle on an internal level and expanding the instances in which they
may lawfully report externally, the lawyer takes on a heightened public
interest role that considers the potential negative effects of client behavior
on various stakeholders, including investors, employees, and the general
public. These developments contrast considerably with the zealous
advocate model.
After the SEC promulgated the Part 205 Rules to satisfy this
congressional mandate, the ABA followed suit. 58 In 2003, the ABA
52. 148 CONG. REC. S6524-02 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. John Edwards); David
A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 441, 462 (2004) (discussing Enron as “a dramatic failure of business culture” in which various
individuals, including lawyers, did not properly carry out their respective roles); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1293–
94 (2003) (stating that, in the wake of Enron, “Congress, the SEC, and the public at large all suspect
that, when sophisticated financial chicanery occurs, lawyers are typically present ‘at the scene of the
crime’” (internal citations omitted)).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 7245 (2018); see also Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys
Act as Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 1027, 1039–40 (2015) (discussing the enactment of these
rules for attorneys).
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 7245; 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (2019).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3).
56. Id. § 205.6.
57. Id. § 205.3(d).
58. Id. § 205.3(b); William Freivogel, Chair, ABA Model Rules and the Business Lawyer, COMM.
PROF’L RESP., http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0077/materials/ethics.pdf
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amended Model Rules 1.6 (duty of confidentiality) and 1.13 (organization
as client) to mirror the new SEC regulations requiring attorney reporting.59
Current Rule 1.6 permits attorneys to disclose confidential client
information without client consent in certain circumstances, including to
prevent a client from committing a crime or fraud “that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the
lawyer’s services.” 60 In addition, Rule 1.13, which governs lawyer
behavior when representing an organization as client, was amended to
include the same up-the-ladder, mandatory attorney reporting duties as
SOX. 61 Rule 1.13 also allows an attorney to report externally without
client consent after exhausting internal reporting if the lawyer reasonably
believes it necessary to prevent substantial harm to the organization,
thereby establishing a permissive disclosure option that is similar to the
Part 205 Rules.62 Notably, Model Rule 1.13 extends even further than the
SOX attorney reporting duties by imposing no limitation on the person or
entity to whom the lawyer may make the permissive disclosure, thereby
allowing the lawyer to report to any third party that may suffer financial
harm due to the organization’s misconduct, as opposed to the Part 205
Rules that limit external disclosures only to the SEC.63
The ABA amendments of Rules 1.6 and 1.13 are believed to have
resulted both from an effort to tame the new federal regulation of attorneys
through SOX and a general desire on the part of the ABA to enhance a
lawyer’s facilitation of increased transparency and accountability within
organizations.64 These amendments and the Part 205 Rules help solidify a
[https://perma.cc/P8H7-YJY9].
59. Freivogel, supra note 58 (summarizing the ABA’s amendments of 2003 to Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13).
60 . MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). These amendments
expanded upon the exceptions that permit lawyers to disclose confidential information to third parties.
Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Corp. Resp., Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task
Force on Corporate Responsibility July 16, 2002, 58 BUS. L. 189, 203–04 (2002) [hereinafter ABA
Amendments].
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). Prior to these amendments,
Rule 1.13’s up-the-ladder reporting obligations were triggered only when misconduct was related to
the lawyer’s representation and the overall tone of the rule tended to discourage the lawyer from
taking action to respond to corporate wrongdoing. See ABA Amendments at 203–04.
62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
63. Id. (stating simply that the “lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation”); see
also Pacella, supra note 34, at 538–39 (explaining how Model Rule 1.13 extends disclosure options
further than that of the Part 205 Rules under SOX).
64. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of
Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 731–33 (2004) (discussing these amendments as a
result of the “ABA’s desire to keep the SEC and the rest of the federal government at bay”); Jenny E.
Cieplak & Michael K. Hibey, The Sarbanes-Oxley Regulations and Model Rule 1.13: Redundant or
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more modern perception of lawyers as “gatekeepers”—individuals who
play a crucial role in the compliance function by monitoring organizations
to prevent unlawful and unethical client behavior. 65 The “gatekeeper”
metaphor envisions the lawyer as exercising authority to either permit or
deny an organization to enter a “gate,” or some business objective,
depending on whether applicable standards or rules would be violated if
allowed to proceed.66 A lawyer’s up-the-ladder reporting duties provide
an “early warning system” for directors (especially those who are
independent and not involved with daily operations) to raise issues and
ensure that the entity has proper channels in place to ensure compliance
with the law. 67 In general, mandatory internal reporting provides
numerous benefits to organizations within any industry, including
avoiding the escalation of problems into unmanageable burdens that may
lead to government investigation, litigation, or financial losses; the

Complementary?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 715, 728 (2004) (noting that the ABA implemented these
amendments to address the public’s desire for increased transparency); Peter J. Henning, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act 307 and Corporate Counsel: Who Better to Prevent Corporate Crime?, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 323,
341 (2004) (noting that the ABA amendments were intended to “reflect what should be the exercise of
sound judgment in representing a corporation, that any misconduct by a corporation’s agent or officer must
be reported to senior management or the organization’s highest authority”).
65. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 28, at 293 (discussing the important role of gatekeepers in the
compliance function); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413–
14 (2008) (discussing how both inside and outside counsel fulfill their gatekeeping roles); Richard E.
Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1107, 113–14 (2006) (discussing the duties of attorneys to act as “gatekeepers” for the
organizations that they represent). Other professionals such as accountants and auditors are also
commonly referred to as “gatekeepers.” See Joseph A. Franco, Of Complicity and Compliance: A
Rules-Based Anti-Complicity Strategy Under Federal Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 37, 69
(2011) (discussing the role of auditors and accountants as gatekeepers).
66. MILLER, supra note 28, at 293–95 (“The gatekeeper has control over the gate, and accordingly
can prevent or impede the client from achieving its objective.”); see also Arthur B. Laby,
Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 123–24 (2006) (noting that
common definitions of gatekeeper include the following: “a reputational intermediary who provides
verification or certification services to investors,” and one “who is ‘positioned at a critical point in
the flow of events’ where approval is needed before a transaction can close” (internal
citations omitted)).
67. Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1112–13 (2003) (discussing that “reporting up” has a valuable gatekeeping function,
including improvement in information flow and early detection of concerning matters); Beverley Earle &
Gerald A. Madek, The New World of Risk for Corporate Attorneys and Their Boards Post-SarbanesOxley: An Assessment of Impact and a Prescription for Action, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 185, 202 (2005)
(discussing how the requirement of reporting up the ladder supports the “SOX mandate that securities
attorneys act as internal gatekeepers”); Theodore Sonde & F. Ryan Keith, “Up the Ladder” and Over:
Regulating Securities Lawyers—Past, Present & Future, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 331, 348 (2003)
(discussing the ABA’s amendments as an effort to promote compliance within entities).
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promotion of an ethical culture; and an increased likelihood that entities
can successfully navigate the modern complex web of regulations.68
In addition, the ability to exercise the permissive disclosure option and
report out illustrates a heightened focus on self-regulation and selfreporting to the government and/or the regulating body of the particular
industry, which are all key concepts in compliance. 69 There are many
examples of current regulatory policies that significantly reduce penalties
for self-reporting violations of the law. For example, pursuant to the
SEC’s analytical framework for deciding whether to bring an enforcement
action against a corporation, the Seaboard Report provides cooperation
credit to entities that actively self-police and self-report violations and
cooperate with the agency to rectify the problem. 70 Additionally, the
DOJ’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Enforcement Policy, now
permanent after a pilot program instituted under the Obama
Administration, significantly benefits entities that self-report, fully
cooperate, and remediate any FCPA-related matters.71
If these actions are taken, the policy allows an entity to receive a
declination from criminal charges and, if criminal charges do become
warranted, self-reporting and cooperation will result in a recommendation
of a fifty percent reduction off the low end of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines.72 The DOJ’s Yates Memo of 2015 also provides consideration
for cooperation under the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
68. James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for Financial
Firms, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1163–64 (2014) (discussing the benefits of compliance programs
and internal reporting); Moberly, supra note 65, at 1132 (2006) (discussing how SOX’s internal
reporting duties are beneficial to the organization).
69. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to
Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 605, 649–51 (1995)
(discussing the avoidance of liability through self-regulation through compliance programs).
70. SEC, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY
ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-44969 (Oct. 23, 2001),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm [https://perma.cc/5587-HCTA]; see also
Robert W. Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposal for a United States Department of Justice Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 167–70 (2010) (discussing
cooperation policies); SEC Spotlight, Enforcement Cooperation Program, SEC (Sept. 20, 2016),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enfcoopinitiative.shtml [https://perma.cc/QN4C-K6SF].
71 . U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENF’T POLICY, (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download
[https://perma.cc/YXQ9-KM3D]
[hereinafter Enf’t Policy]; see also Karen Woody, “Declinations with Disgorgement” in FCPA
Enforcement, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 269, 270–71 (2018) (discussing how the FCPA’s Pilot
Program, with its focus on incentivizing voluntary disclosure and government cooperation, provides
for eligibility for a declination from the DOJ).
72 . Enf’t Policy, supra note 71 (declinations are generally granted “absent aggravating
circumstances involving the seriousness of the offense or the nature of the offender”).
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Organizations to entities that make a complete disclosure to the DOJ of
“all relevant facts about individual misconduct.” 73 As such, the Yates
Memo encourages self-reporting, specifically as it pertains to identifying
culpable individuals within an organization. 74 The overwhelming
expansion of these governmental policies allows organizations that have
effective compliance programs and skilled compliance officers on board
to avoid significant penalties through a focus on deterrence, self-policing,
and self-reporting, each of which are descriptive of some of the most
fundamental components of the compliance function. 75 As compliance
roles continue to expand, new questions arise as to the regulation of the
lawyers operating in such roles.
II.

THE REGULATION OF “LAW-RELATED SERVICES”

A.

The Practice of Law

As a threshold matter, the inevitable question of whether lawyers
operating in compliance roles are “practicing law” must be addressed.
Although collective instinct may deem such work to be outside the realm
of law practice, the title of lawyer, in itself, often leads constituents of an
organization to believe, whether the case or not, that an attorney-client
relationship has been formed. 76 As noted earlier, even the ABA’s
Compliance Officer’s Deskbook acknowledges that a lawyer who is a
compliance officer is likely to expect the substance of their work to be
privileged,77 but it is necessary to be cognizant of the fine lines between
law practice and law-related services, the latter of which may not

73 . U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE WRONGDOING,
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/M69Y-CSCQ]
(the Yates Memo places a heavy focus on the importance of identification of all individuals involved
in the misconduct).
74. Catherine Greaves, DOJ Stresses Individual Accountability in New “Yates Memo”, A.B.A.
(Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/aba_health_esource/20152016/october/yatesmemo.html [http://perma.cc/86Y5-MHZ2].
75. See, e.g., Todd Haugh, Nudging Corporate Compliance, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 683, 700 (2017)
(defining compliance as a system of policies or processes aimed to deter violations of the law,
regulations, or applicable norms); Sarah L. Stafford, Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide
Self-Policing Regimes, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2293, 2297 (2011) (discussing the importance of
voluntary self-policing as part of the compliance function).
76. See Michele DeStefano, Creating A Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization May Not
Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 137 (2014) (quoting general counsel who oversee
compliance roles stating that constituents of an organization view lawyers who are not in a role in
which they are practicing law as lawyers, nonetheless, to be relied on for legal advice regardless of
title).
77. COMPLIANCE OFFICER’S DESKBOOK, supra note 11, at 124.
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necessarily invoke the privilege or other coveted characteristics of an
attorney-client relationship.
The question of attorney-client privilege applicability is a crucial
consideration for compliance work given its influence upon the
individuals comprising the organization. If such persons know from the
onset that the privilege applies, they are likely to share information with
the lawyer much more freely. When the general counsel serves
simultaneously as the compliance officer, it is often quite difficult for
individuals to know whether or not the privilege applies.78 Attorney-client
privilege applies to communications between an attorney and client when
made for the purpose of obtaining an opinion of law, legal services, or
assistance in a legal proceeding, and when made without the presence of
strangers.79 The privilege applies only to situations in which the lawyer is
providing “legal advice or services” and “will not protect disclosure of
non-legal communications where the attorney acts as a business or
economic advisor.” 80 As courts have made clear, neither the attorneyclient privilege nor work-product protections apply to documents or
communications produced as part of an internal investigation within an
entity’s compliance department when that investigation was not
conducted for the purpose of receiving or providing legal advice, prior to
litigation emerging, or when a non-lawyer carrying out the investigation
was not acting as the lawyer’s direct agent.81
78. See, e.g., Thomas O’Connor, When You Come to A Fork in the Road, Take It: Unifying the Split
in New York’s Analysis of In-House Attorney-Client Privilege, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 437, 457 (2016)
(noting the difficulty for the corporate client to determine whether communications at issue are legal
in nature and subject to the attorney-client privilege when an attorney is simultaneously serving as a
compliance officer).
79. See Peterson v. Bernardi, 262 F.R.D. 424, 428 (D.N.J. 2009); Edwards v. Whitaker, 868 F.
Supp. 226, 228 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (citing Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 630
(W.D.N.Y.1993)).
80. Whitaker, 868 F. Supp. at 228 (citing Hydraflow, 145 F.R.D. at 631); see also United States v.
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[E]ven though litigation is already in prospect, there
is no work-product immunity for documents prepared in the regular course of business rather than for
purposes of the litigation.” (quoting Charles A. Wright et al., 8 Fed. Prac. & Procedure § 2024, at
346)); U.S. ex rel. Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., No. 1:10–CV–00127, 2013 WL 5525697, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 4, 2013) (finding that business communications made in business meetings when an attorney is
present are not protected from disclosure).
81 . See, e.g., Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 979 F. Supp. 2d 479, 495–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“Privilege does not apply to an internal corporate investigation . . . made by management itself.”
(internal citations omitted)); Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 273 F.R.D. 545, 557 (D. Ariz.
2011) (determining that attorney-client privilege did not apply to the results of an investigation
conducted by a compliance officer); Omnicare, 2013 WL 5525697, at *2 (holding that the attorneyclient privilege did not apply to documents drafted by a compliance officer just because general
counsel and other attorneys may have also received these documents). But see In re Kellogg Brown
& Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding privilege applied to communications
between company employees and non-attorney investigators acting at the direction of counsel when
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In at least one instance, a court denied application of the attorney-client
privilege to communications made by constituents of an organization to a
non-lawyer chief compliance officer conducting routine compliance
work, even though the general counsel directly supervised the compliance
department.82 Despite the attorney’s supervisory role over the compliance
department, the court found that the privilege was still not applicable
because the compliance officer was not preparing for a lawsuit or
responding to legal claims or litigation at the time. 83 Therefore, the
privilege is not likely to apply to most interactions with compliance
officers who, in the course of their typical job duties, are not rendering
legal advice or opinions or defending the company in a legal proceeding,
all of which are actions that have traditionally described the “practice of
law.” 84 Rather, the compliance officer is monitoring and managing an
organization’s behavior to avoid that these very actions ever
become necessary.
Many scholars have acknowledged the significant difficulty of defining
“the practice of law” in any concrete manner,85 especially as it pertains to
rendering legal advice versus non-legal business or strategic advice86— a
discrepancy that is especially relevant in the field of compliance. The
Model Rules provide no definition of the “practice of law” and defer the
matter completely to the individual states.87 Comment 2 to Model Rule
5.5, which prohibits the unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers,
notes that the “definition of the practice of law is established by law and
varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting
the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against
rendition of legal services by unqualified persons.”88 As is visible through
this commentary, the ABA appears most concerned about the risk that a

the investigators were deemed “agents” of the attorney).
82. Whitaker, 868 F. Supp. at 228.
83. Id.
84. See infra notes 89–91.
85. See, e.g., DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2961–62 (noting, especially in the context of determining
whether unauthorized practice of law statutes apply, the inability of the legal profession to define the
practice of law); Brandon M. Meyers, Addressing the Boundaries of the Legal Profession’s Monopoly
Through A Model Definition of the Practice of Law, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 321, 325 (2016) (noting the
absence of a clear definition of the practice of law); Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy B. Ricca, Protecting
the Profession or the Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
2587, 2605 (2014) (noting the widespread lack of definition of the practice of law).
86. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2961–62 (noting that this distinction is “indeterminate”).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also In re Pinkins, 213
B.R. 818, 820 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 1977) (“The formidable task of constructing a definition of the
practice of law has largely been left to the judiciary.” (internal citations omitted)).
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5. cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis added).
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non-attorney will perform responsibilities that could constitute the
“practice of law,” rather than providing guidance as to how a clear
definition is established. This lack of clarity is pertinent to compliance
officers who are also lawyers, given the gray area in determining whether
they are providing services that are legal in nature.
Definitions of the practice of law across the fifty states are “consistently
vague,” fact-specific, and extremely difficult to summarize into one
description.89 Many judicial interpretations have expressed the inability to
set forth a precise description of law practice, thereby making clear that
questions on the topic must be decided on a case-by-case basis depending
on the specific facts of the matter.90 For example, an Arkansas court stated
that “[r]esearch of authorities by able counsel and by this court has failed
to turn up any clear, comprehensible definition of what really constitutes
the practice of law. Courts are not in agreement. We believe it is
impossible to frame any comprehensive definition of what constitutes the
practice of law.”91 A court in Florida held that:
Many courts have attempted to set forth a broad definition of the
practice of law. Being of the view that such is nigh onto
impossible and may injuriously affect the rights of others not here
involved, we will not attempt to do so here. Rather we will do so
only to the extent required to settle the issues of this case.92
As these quotes reveal, state courts have tended to shy away from
establishing a definition that could be widely applicable, thus deferring
the question to some future determination where individual facts will be

89. Lauren Moxley, Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer Rights Approach to Reforming the
Lawyer’s Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 553, 563 (2015); see
also, e.g., Evan G. Zuckerman, Justicecorps: Helping Pro Se Litigants Bridge A Divide, 49 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 551, 584 (2016) (discussing the variations among states in defining law practice);
Victor Li, Talk to Me Issues Papers Seeking Feedback on How Legal Services Are Regulated Prompt
Lots of Comments but Little Consensus, 102 A.B.A. J. 65, 66 (Sept. 2016) (discussing the extreme
difficulty in defining what constitutes the practice of law).
90 . See Anya E.R. Prince & Arlene M. Davis, Navigating Professional Norms in an InterProfessional Environment: The ‘Practice’ of Healthcare Ethics Committees, 15 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
115, 139 (2016) (noting that states have “experienced difficulty” in creating rules to guide what is
meant by the practice of law); Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Big Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1389 (2015) (discussing the lack of clarity as to how states define
the practice of law).
91. Ark. Bar Ass’n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, 914 (1959) (concluding subsequently that each case
presenting this issue must be decided based on its own facts).
92. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962); see also State ex rel. Johnson
v. Childe, 23 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Neb. 1946) (“An all inclusive definition of what constitutes the
practice of law is too difficult for simple statement. We shall not attempt it here. . . .”).
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analyzed. The existing state definitions are “not much more helpful than
the standard for defining obscenity: we know it when we see it.”93
The ABA has compiled a comparison of the fifty states’ definitions of
the “practice of law,” which, upon examination, reveal that some common
themes may be drawn from the various definitions—all such themes
center around a litigation-focused approach in which client representation
occurs in a tribunal-like or adversarial setting.94 Many state definitions
focus heavily on adjudicative elements, defining law practice, most
prominently, to include actions like appearing as an advocate; drawing
papers or pleadings to enforce rights before a court or other entity as part
of proceedings; preparing or drafting documents to enforce legal rights;
or providing redress for a lack of rights or wrong committed.95 All of these
actions imply that “law practice” constitutes a reactive response to a
problem, rather than a preventative measure to avoid problems before
they occur.
While some states have also acknowledged that the practice of law may
be described more generally as providing advice or counsel on various
subjects, none have included the monitoring, surveillance, and
preventative measures that are typically descriptive of a compliance
officer’s duties within their definitions.96 Rather, the “practice of law”
tends to center on after-the-fact representation in which clients are in need
of some type of advocacy because they have been sued or their rights have
been violated in some way. While “practice of law” definitions fail to
provide one consistent description, most states do converge on the
requirement that the person providing the services is one specifically
trained or knowledgeable in the law; operates in a representative capacity
to enforce or defend another’s rights with skilled, legal knowledge;97 or
93. Andrew M. Perlman, Towards the Law of Legal Services, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 49, 88–89 (2015).
94. A.B.A., State Definitions of the Practice of
Law, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professionalresponsibility/mod
el-def_migrated/model_def_statutes.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QZA-HLWP]
[hereinafter A.B.A., State Definitions]; see also Bruce A. Green, The Litigator’s Monopoly, 40
A.B.A. Litig. 10 (Summer 2014) (discussing that there are ambiguities as to what
professional services are “legal services” versus the “practice of law” for purposes of unauthorized
practice of law statutes and noting that, despite the lack of clarity, “it has long been assumed that if
any one service constitutes the practice of law and is therefore off-limits to non-lawyers, it
is litigation.”).
95. A.B.A., State Definitions, supra note 94 (citing the various state adaptations of the definition
of the practice of law); see also Moxley, supra note 89, at 563 (noting that a comparative analysis of
the various state definitions have summarized the following duties as most comprehensive in outlining
what comprises the practice of law: directing and managing the enforcement of legal rights or legal
claims, giving or offering legal advice as to such enforcement, rendering opinions, and drafting
documents “by which such rights are created, modified, surrendered or secured . . . .”).
96. A.B.A., State Definitions, supra note 94.
97. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.08.230 (R. 63) (2019); Denver Bar Ass’n v. Public Utilities

15 Pacella.docx (Do Not Delete)

968

5/31/20 12:08 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:947

possesses the “professional judgment of a lawyer.”98 The ABA has also
attempted to set forth that “functionally the practice of law ‘relates to the
rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of
a lawyer.”‘99
In light of the uncertainty of defining the practice of law and the general
consensus among states that, at a minimum, possession of specialized,
legal knowledge or judgment is required, it is a reasonable conclusion that
the work of a compliance officer or a person engaged in the compliance
function does not fit squarely into the “practice of law” for purposes of
triggering adherence to all of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. This is the case because compliance officers are not
necessarily trained in law. As previously noted, such individuals need not
possess a J.D. or a law license. While possession of a J.D. may be an
advantage, it is not a requirement for the job.100 Further, the definitions of
law practice among the states have in common a focus on litigationrelated activities, whether the drafting of pleadings, advocacy, or
representation in an adjudicative setting.101 Such activities are not on par
with the work of a compliance officer, which is focused on organizational
monitoring for red flags to ensure, well in advance of actual violations,

Comm’n, 391 P.2d 467, 471 (Colo. 1964) (“We believe that generally one who acts in a representative
capacity in protecting, enforcing, or defending the legal rights and duties of another and in counseling,
advising and assisting him in connection with these rights and duties is engaged in the practice of law
[in Colorado].”); Fink v. Peden, 17 N.E.2d 95, 96 (Ind. 1938) (noting that, in Indiana, the “practice
of law” “is to carry on the business of an attorney at law . . . to exercise the calling or profession of
the law.”); KY. REV. STAT. § SCR 3.020 (2020); LA. REV. STAT. § 37: 212 (2012); In re Welch, 185
A.2d 458, 459 (Vt. 1962) (“In general, one is deemed to be practicing law whenever he furnishes to
another advice or service under circumstances which imply the possession and use of legal knowledge
and skill.”).
98. See, e.g., N.H. SUP. CT. r. 35 (defining law practice as that which requires the “professional
judgment of a lawyer,” which is defined as the “educated ability to relate the general body and
philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client”); IOWA CODE PROF’L RESP. EC 3-5; State
ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962) (noting that those engaged in law practice
“ possess legal skill and a knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average citizen”);
R. J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407, 416 (Okla. 1972) (defining the practice of law in Kansas as
“the rendition of services requiring the knowledge and application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interests of another with his consent”); In re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ill. 1994)
(“The focus of the inquiry must be on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge and
skill in order to apply legal principles and precedent.”); State v. Rogers, 705 A.2d 397, 400 (N.J. App.
Div. 1998) (“The practice of law is not ‘limited to the conduct of cases in court but is engaged in
whenever and wherever legal knowledge, training, skill, and ability are required.’” (internal citations
omitted)).
99 . A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1311 (Mar. 11, 1975)
(internal citations omitted).
100. See supra section I.A.
101. See supra notes 95–99.
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that an entity is conforming its behavior to the expectations of the
appropriate governing regulatory agency.
As discussed, in many cases, a compliance officer, in conjunction with
the organization, would opt to self-report the non-conformities to the
government for cooperation credit or to work in tandem with the agency
to establish a compliance remediation plan. 102 Each of these activities,
especially the self-reporting, diverge from the traditional role of attorneys
that still largely comprise the various state definitions of law practice. For
these reasons, compliance work that does not overlap with the general
counsel function is not likely to fit squarely within services that constitute
the “practice of law.” The next logical inquiry, then, is whether a better fit
for compliance constitutes “law-related services,” which, if deemed
applicable, would trigger full adherence to the professional rules of
conduct pursuant to ABA Model Rule 5.7.103
B.

Rule 5.7

One study, which consisted of interviews with seventy compliance
officers and general counsels of S&P 500 corporations across different
industries, revealed that most of the individuals within those entities
perceived compliance officers, whether trained in the law or not, as being
involved with interpreting the law in some way or offering advice that
may be legally related.104 As various interviewees expressed, “you often
face . . . compliance officers giving legal advice—and it’s hard for them
not to do it sometimes, given the nature and scope of their jobs . . . . ” and
“internal clients, and even lawyers working within the legal department
itself, sometimes believe that they can receive (or are receiving) legal
advice from the compliance officer.” 105 The compliance officers
interviewed who hold no law degree or law license also expressed that
their job largely consists of reading and interpreting the law or regulations
that are on point to guide their monitoring of the entity, which involves
researching and interpreting legal precedent for guidance.106 As such, it is
often not clear where legal work ends and compliance duties begin.

102. See supra section I.B.
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
104. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2977; see also James Fanto, Dashboard Compliance: Benefit,
Threat, or Both?, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L 1, 7 (2016) (noting that “compliance officers
are specialists in legal obligations” and also contribute greatly to the ethical climate and culture of the
institution).
105. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2977 (emphasis added) (quoting various interviewees).
106. Id. at 2978.
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As explained in the previous section, while it is not a precise fit to
define compliance work as the “practice of law,” at a minimum, a lawyer
in a compliance role is very likely to render services that would be “lawrelated” given the broad definition of how such services are defined.107
Accordingly, ABA’s Model Rule 5.7, “Responsibilities Regarding Lawrelated Services,” would be triggered, which prompts adherence to the full
range of ethical rules even when the services provided are non-legal. Rule
5.7 rule reads in full as follows:
a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct
with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in
paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer
individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable
measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related
services knows that the services are not legal services and that the
protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term “law-related services” denotes services that might
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are
related to the provision of legal services, and that are not
prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a
non-lawyer.108
The definition of “law-related services” is very much on point to
describe the compliance function. Commentary to the rule elaborates that
“law-related services” would exist in a “broad range of economic and
other interests of clients,” with enumerated examples including
“providing title insurance, financial planning, accounting, trust services,
real estate counseling, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social
work, psychological counseling, tax preparation, and patent, medical or
environmental consulting.” 109 Given the expansiveness of this
commentary and the definition itself, it is reasonable to argue that
compliance work is, at a minimum, descriptive of the services listed
above. A compliance officer’s work largely consists of interpreting
applicable law, regulations, and statutes, and monitoring the organization
for conformity with these mandates through compliance programs,
advice, internal reporting systems, and the encouragement of ethical
107. Id. at 2979 (noting that the following law-related services may be included in the corporate
compliance context: public relations, banking, financial, or accounting services).
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis added).
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7. cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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practices—all constituting services that are very likely to “reasonably be
performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to” legal
services.110 Compliance services are substantively related to legal services
not only because an entity’s legal and compliance functions must be in
sync to ensure appropriate remediation of any violations, 111 but also
because it is ultimately the law itself that dictates whether an organization
has complied with the regulations incumbent upon it and whether its
compliance program is effective. Simply put, one must know the laws and
regulations in substance to ensure compliance with them.
In addition, it is significant that the definition of law-related services
includes a requirement that the services being offered “are not prohibited
as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a non-lawyer.” 112
Therefore, the services must actually comprise those that may lawfully be
carried out by non-legal laypersons without any argument that such
persons are committing an unauthorized practice of law.113 As discussed,
there is absolutely no requirement that a compliance officer be an
attorney—a law degree or law license, while desirable in the current era,
have never been prerequisites to employment qualification. For these
reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that the compliance function fits
squarely within the realm of what would constitute law-related services,
thereby prompting adherence to Rule 5.7.
Subsection (1) of the rule triggers the application of all of the
professional rules of conduct when a lawyer provides law-related services
that are so intertwined with the legal services being rendered that the two
are indistinguishable from each other, which often occurs when the lawyer
is providing both types of services with respect to the same matter.114 As
this part of the rule guards against, when the two types of services are
indistinguishable in this way, it is reasonable for the recipient to
mistakenly believe that all of the various protections of the attorney-client
relationship are being afforded, including a duty of confidentiality,
prohibitions against conflicts of interest, and, if applicable, the existence
of attorney-client privilege.115

110. See supra section I.A.
111. See infra note 181.
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
113. Unauthorized practice of law statutes, which have been adopted in some form by all of the states,
bar prohibit non-lawyers from providing legal services and practicing law. See generally David G. Ebner,
Crossing the Border: Issues in the Multistate Practice of Law, ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. SPEC. INST.
(1988); DeStefano, supra note 8, at 2961 (discussing unauthorized practice of law statutes).
114. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
115. See id. at cmt. 1; PHILA. BAR ASS’N, Ethics Op. 2003-16 (2004) (discussing the situations that
Rule 5.7 is intended to cover).
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This type of scenario is most likely to play out when a lawyer wears
the dual hat of compliance officer and general counsel and is thus
providing both legal and law-related services at the same time. As
examined earlier in this section, it may prove to be impossible to
distinguish between legal and law-related services in this context, and
result in significant confusion for organizational clients to know whether
an attorney-client relationship exists in all settings. 116 Therefore, it is
reasonable, per Rule 5.7, to expect a joint general counsel/compliance
officer to follow the full spectrum of attorney professional conduct rules
for both types of services.
In circumstances where the legal and law-related services are distinct
from each other, however, subsection (2) is applicable. The crux of this
subsection is to trigger adherence to the full set of professional conduct
rules in all other circumstances not captured by subsection (1).117 As such,
the coverage of this rule is much broader than it initially appears on its
face to apply to the services rendered by “entities” that are controlled by
lawyers. 118 This situation is most likely to occur when the chief
compliance officer of an organization is not simultaneously the general
counsel, or operates within a separate department from that of
legal counsel.
Rule 5.7 was developed in the early 1990s in response to efforts by law
firms to relax restrictions on lawyers sharing fees with non-lawyers and
to regulate lawyers engaging in ancillary businesses or creating
multidisciplinary practice arrangements with other professionals like
accountants, engineers, social workers, or medical experts.119 While Rule
5.7’s original aim was to ensure that lawyers engaged in ancillary
businesses or business ventures with non-lawyers would still be held to
ethical rules for their non-legal services if the client failed to understand
that there was no attorney-client relationship for those services, 120 the
modern interpretation of this rule is much broader and extends to lawyers

116. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
117. Id.; see also infra note 118 and accompanying text.
118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2) cmt. 4. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); Spitzer, supra
note 20, at 6, 50.
119. See Roberta S. Karmel, Will Law Firms Go Public?, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 487, 498 (2013)
(noting that New York adopted Rule 5.7 in light of the recognition that law firms often provide nonlegal services that may be difficult to distinguish from legal services); Spitzer, supra note 20, at 50–
52 (discussing the history of Rule 5.7).
120. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING, 51:02, 51–54 (4th ed.,
2015); Spitzer, supra note 20, at 50 (discussing the history of the ABA as it pertains to the
development of this rule).
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in any setting who provide law-related services that laypersons may
also perform.121
Application of the rule in this manner was solidified by the ABA’s
House of Delegates Ethics 2000 Commission, which amended some
Model Rules and broadened Rule 5.7’s scope specifically to apply to all
circumstances not covered by subsection (1), which captures all instances
in which a lawyer provides law-related services that are distinct from legal
services.122 The Commission explained that the change in interpretation
was needed to “eliminate[] an unintended gap in the coverage of the
Model Rule” and “precludes an overly restrictive reading of paragraph
(a)(1) to the effect that the provision of law-related services could never
be distinct from the provision of legal services if directly provided by a
lawyer or law firm.” 123 This extensive reach of Rule 5.7, however, is
reined in by an exception providing an “out” articulated in subsection (2),
which allows lawyers to avoid being subject to the full span of
professional conduct rules if they take “reasonable measures” to inform
the recipient of the law-related services that such services are not legal in
nature and that the protective benefits of an attorney-client relationship
will not be triggered.124 This provision has been described as a “consumer
and public protection regulation . . . meant to protect non-legally trained
individuals from being taken advantage of by lawyers.”125
Most state jurisdictions have adopted Rule 5.7 as it is currently
written.126 The following fifteen states have not adopted Rule 5.7 in any
form: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas,
Virginia, and Wyoming.127 The following states have adopted the same
language that is set forth in the ABA’s Model Rule 5.7: Arizona,

121. Spitzer, supra note 20, at 62 (discussing the applicability of the rule to all lawyers providing
“law-like activities” that may also be provided by non-lawyers).
122. Ethics 2000 Commission, MODEL RULE 5.7, REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES, AM.
BAR ASS’N., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_c
ommission/e2k_rule57rem/ [https://perma.cc/4TXV-8WRE]; see also Spitzer, supra note 20, at 62–
63 (discussing the broad application of Rule 5.7).
123. Ethics 2000 Commission, supra note 122.
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
125. Spitzer, supra note 20, at 55.
126. See infra notes 127–128.
127. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; CONN. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT; HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; KY. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT; LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; NEV.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT; and
TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (each lacking some version of Model Rule 5.7).
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Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,128 Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Washington, D.C.129
New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, however, have each made some
noteworthy variations to their versions of the rule. New York’s Rule 5.7
uses the term “nonlegal services” rather than “law-related services,”
which is defined as “those services that lawyers may lawfully provide and
that are not prohibited as an unauthorized practice of law when provided
by a nonlawyer.”130 In contrast, the ABA version of the rule contains a
reasonability requirement to determine the meaning of “law-related
services,” defining such services as those “that might reasonably be
performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the
provision of legal services.”131 New York’s adaptation thereby renders the
universe of services subject to this rule broader than those covered by the
Model Rules given that it encompasses nearly all services in which any
non-lawyer may also engage. Subsection (2) of the New York rule also
differs from Model Rule 5.7 in two important respects, and reads as
follows:
A lawyer or law firm that provides nonlegal services to a person
that are distinct from legal services being provided to that person
by the lawyer or law firm is subject to these Rules with respect to
the nonlegal services if the person receiving the services could
128. The language of Georgia’s Rule 5.7 is the same as that of the ABA version except that it adds
the following sentence at the end of the rule to limit the maximum penalty for lawyers who fail to
comply with the rule: “The maximum penalty for a violation of this Rule is a public reprimand.” See
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7.
129. See ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; COLO.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; GA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 5.7; HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7;
IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; KAN. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; MD. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
5.7; MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; MINN.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; NEB. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 5.7; N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7;
N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; OKLA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; R.I. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
5.7; S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; UTAH RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; WASH. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 5.7; W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7; WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7;
D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7.
130. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(c).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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reasonably believe that the nonlegal services are the subject of a
client-lawyer relationship.132
The first difference is that New York’s version prioritizes client
interpretation, rather than a lawyer’s directive, to determine whether the
protections of the attorney-client relationship will be triggered. This
determination is based on the client’s “reasonabl[e] belie[f]” as to whether
such a relationship was formed, 133 rather than any action taken by the
lawyer to inform the client otherwise. Like use of the term “nonlegal
services,”134 such language has the effect of broadening the reach of the
rule to require lawyers to follow all of the professional rules in the course
of their compliance work.
Second, the above language makes clear that the available “out”
(although harder to achieve through the New York rule since it is based
on the reasonable belief of the recipient of the services) is not limited to
the context of services provided by “entities,” but also captures individual
lawyers. The advantage of such language over the current form of ABA’s
Model Rule 5.7 is that it is clearly stated in the rule and allows an
individual lawyer who is providing non-legal services that are distinct
from legal services to have a mechanism for avoiding the full application
of the professional rules. Although the reach of ABA’s Model Rule 5.7 is
intended to have the same result after the clarifications of the Ethics 2000
Commission discussed earlier,135 the fact that current subsection (2) fails
to explicitly name individual lawyers creates the potential for confusion
as to whether a lawyer falling in this category may avoid the full
application of the rules by using “reasonable measures” to inform the
recipient that the services are not legal. One scholar has expressed that the
drafting of subsection (2), in referring only to “entities,” was an oversight
and should be treated as such.136
Further, the “out” available in the New York rule is expanded upon
through an additional subsection stating the following:
[I]t will be presumed that the person receiving non-legal services
believes the services to be the subject of a client-lawyer
relationship unless the lawyer or law firm has advised the person
receiving the services in writing that the services are not legal
services and that the protection of a client-lawyer relationship
does not exist with respect to the non-legal services. . . . 137
132. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 122–123.
136. Spitzer, supra note 20, at 63.
137. N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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While, at first glance, the presumption described here may create
concerns of expanded liability for lawyers because it would automatically
create an attorney-client relationship if no action is taken by the lawyer, it
provides the benefit of making absolutely clear (unlike Model Rule 5.7,
which uses the term “reasonable measures”) exactly what a New York
lawyer must do to avoid application of the presumption. In this way, New
York lawyers providing non-legal services are called upon to take clearly
articulated steps from the onset, in the form of a writing, to avoid any
confusion as to the nature of the services being provided.
Pennsylvania’s Rule 5.7, similar to that of New York, also uses the term
“nonlegal services” rather than “law-related services,” but defines it in the
same manner as Model Rule 5.7.138 Its equivalent of subsection (2) is also
similar to that of New York in that it captures both lawyers who own or
control ancillary businesses and those who do not in having an “out” from
full application of the ethical rules.139 In this case, adherence to the ethical
rules is triggered “if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
recipient might believe that the recipient is receiving the protection of a
client-lawyer relationship.” 140 Thus, Pennsylvania’s rule is more of a
middle road between that of Model Rule 5.7, which is focused on a lawyer
taking “reasonable measures,” and New York’s Rule 5.7, which is clientfocused. The Pennsylvania rule then proceeds to excuse lawyers from full
adherence to the ethical rules if they have made “reasonable efforts to
avoid any misunderstanding by the recipient receiving nonlegal
services.” 141 Such “efforts must include advising the recipient that the
services are not legal services and that the protection of a client-lawyer
relationship does not exist with respect to the provision of nonlegal
services to the recipient.” 142 Therefore, this rule provides for a similar
disclosure requirement as that of New York, but lacks the requirement that
it be in writing.
In response to an inquiry from a general counsel of a corporation who
was being asked to make a non-legal business decision for the company,
a Philadelphia Bar Association Advisory Opinion advised that its Rule 5.7
applies in this exact situation and that the lawyer “has a duty” to the client
to (a) clearly explain when and how attorney-client privilege would apply;
138. PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(e). “Non-legal services” in Pennsylvania are defined as
“services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the
provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided
by a nonlawyer.” Id.
139. Id. r. 5.7(b), (c).
140. Id. r. 5.7(c).
141. Id. r. 5.7(d).
142. Id.
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(b) clearly explain that certain communications in this context may not be
privileged; and (c) articulate which non-legal services are so distinct from
legal services that the protections of the rules of professional conduct may
not apply.143 This letter emphasized the sheer importance of informing the
client of these facts in advance, since any work done by the in-house
counsel, whether non-legal or legal, “will have the imprimatur of being
done by an attorney, and thus could be subject by others who scrutinize
her conduct to the expectation that the highest ethical standards apply to
all of her company functions.”144
Finally, Ohio’s version of Rule 5.7 requires an additional mandate for
a lawyer “who controls or owns an interest in a business that provides a
law-related service,” barring lawyers from “requir[ing] any customer of
that business to agree to legal representation by the lawyer as a condition
of the engagement of that business.”145 In such instances, lawyers must
disclose their interest in the business to any such customers and inform
them that they are free to “obtain legal services elsewhere. . . . ”146 In this
way, the rule ensures (a) that a lawyer operating an ancillary business will
not induce already-existing customers receiving non-legal services from
the business to continue to work with the lawyer if legal services are later
needed; and (b) vice-versa—that an existing client of a lawyer receiving
legal services need not utilize the lawyer’s ancillary business if any nonlegal services are desired.
In summary, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio have each included
on the face of the rule itself some form of disclosure obligation involving
affirmative steps that the lawyer must take to ensure, from the onset, that
it is absolutely clear that the law-related or non-legal services being
provided do not carry with them all of the protections of a typical attorneyclient relationship. In turn, the lawyer is able to avoid the full application
of the professional rules to their non-legal services. In the context of the
compliance function, this type of clarity is especially crucial given that
full application of the professional rules would result in exceedingly
complex and sometimes impossible expectations on the part of the nonpracticing compliance lawyer given that such work does not fit squarely
into the types of rules that were created to govern the “practice of law.”
As a result, lawyers in such positions become subject to considerable
personal liability. These concerns will be addressed next.

143. PHILA. BAR ASS’N, Advisory Op. 2008-8 (Oct. 2008).
144. Id.
145. OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(b), (c).
146. Id. r. 5.7(b).
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III. LIABILITY CONCERNS FOR LAWYERS IN COMPLIANCE
A.

Imprecise Fit of Professional Conduct Rules

When compliance officers who are also lawyers become subject to the
full span of professional conduct rules, they also become susceptible to
heightened personal liability and potential disciplinary action by their
respective jurisdictions for risk of violating one of the many ethical rules
that are not a perfect fit for the non-legal, compliance work that they
provide. There are several examples of professional conduct rules that
would create unique difficulties to ensure that the rule is properly
followed by compliance officers who, although may be admitted to the
bar and answerable to their respective jurisdiction of admission, are
neither serving in a general counsel role nor practicing law.
For example, Model Rule 1.1 requires a lawyer to represent a client
competently, defined as “requir[ing] the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.” 147 To ensure adherence to this rule, lawyers who are
functioning as compliance officers described above must possess the
requisite knowledge and skill pertaining to the applicable regulatory
scheme that governs the industry in which their organization is operating,
which may prove to be a very difficult task because of the extensive
breadth and depth of the regulations in question, both at the state and
federal level. 148 In addition, lawyers would need to constantly monitor
their shortcomings as they pertain to competency issues and, if necessary,
“refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established
competence in the field in question.” 149 This requirement may be
problematic in the types of organizational settings in which compliance
officers or compliance departments exist, as opposed to a law firm or legal

147. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). In determining whether
competency exists, the commentary to the rule lists various factors to be considered, including:
The relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience,
the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer
is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult
with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. Id. cmt. 1.
148. See William W. Horton, When Two Worlds Collide: Ethics Challenges in the Compliance
Officer-General
Counsel
Relationship,
JONES
WALKER
LLP
(Dec.
2015),
https://kipdf.com/queue/when-two-worlds-collide-ethics-challenges-in-the-compliance-officergeneral-coun_5acbb1197f8b9aeb918b45a8.html [https://perma.cc/AEV2-Z4AW] (discussing how
ensuring competency creates potential concerns for joint lawyers/compliance officers working in the
healthcare compliance arena).
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).

15 Pacella.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/31/20 12:08 AM

THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN COMPLIANCE

979

department where others with varying specializations may be readily
available for reference.150
In addition, the rules pertaining to the disclosure of confidential
information in Model Rule 1.6 and to conflicts of interest in Model Rules
1.7 to 1.11 are of particular concern to a joint lawyer/compliance
officer.151 Pursuant to Rule 1.6, lawyers must maintain client confidences,
which the ABA deems a “fundamental principle” that “contributes to the
trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.” 152 Various
exceptions allow lawyers to reveal confidential information when they
reasonably believe necessary to prevent severe instances such as death,
bodily harm, crimes and frauds, and other permitted circumstances. 153
Lawyers held to this rule in the compliance context must be particularly
cognizant of its limitations, especially given their duties to report the
organization’s compliance violations to the board of directors or the
applicable regulator. If this rule were to apply to their compliance work,
they would need to be careful to argue that an external report fits one of
the exceptions to the rule permitting disclosure, which is not likely to be
the case when the report is being made preemptively to a regulator to
timely address an early-stage red flag.154
Further, Model Rules 1.7 through 1.9 each bar a lawyer from
representing clients if doing so would involve a conflict of interest,
whether posing a conflict with current or future clients (Rules 1.7 and 1.9,
respectively), or where a lawyer acquires an interest that is adverse to the
client (Rule 1.8).155 Rule 1.8 is likely to emerge as a greater concern for
compliance officers in the context of compensation issues. When a
compliance officer’s compensation structure is based on the business
line’s financial performance, this could create a conflict of interest and

150. See Horton, supra note 148 (noting that certain compliance-related skills, specifically in the
healthcare sector, may involve technical billing and coding, medical necessity, or cost report issues,
which tend to be out of the purview of the lawyer/compliance officer).
151. Comment 10 to Model Rule 5.7 highlights these rules as being particularly important when a
lawyer rendering law-related services is obliged to adhere to the full set of ethical rules. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
152. Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 2.
153. Id. r. 1.6(b).
154 . John B. McNeece, IV, The Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General Counsel and Chief
Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 678 (2012); see also DeStefano, supra note 8, at
124 (discussing how the “rules and standards regulating lawyers” differentiate them from compliance
officers with respect to self-reporting); Preserving Confidentiality, 12 ACCA DOCKET, no. 1, Winter
1994, at 24, 44 (noting that a compliance officer’s failure to report may result in a complicit
individual being subject to prosecution, whereas a lawyer has an obligation to maintain confidentiality
in such situations).
155. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, and 1.11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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undermine the independence of the compliance function.156 Although an
October 2008 letter issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve advised that compensation and incentive programs for
compliance staff should not be based on financial business performance
to avoid these types of conflicts, a recent survey of compliance staff
compensation by the National Regulatory Services revealed that sixty
percent of the respondents do participate in some type of incentive
compensation program.157 Such concerns are especially prevalent in the
financial services industry, in which incentive compensation through
annual bonuses may have the effect of doubling or tripling one’s base
income.158
In addition to the potential conflict stemming from compensationbased issues, a compliance officer’s direct reporting line may also pose a
conflict of interest concern. It is commonly argued that the board of
directors should have oversight over compliance officers with respect to
hiring, compensation, and termination, and that compliance officers
should report directly to the board rather than to officers or general
counsel.159 Yet in many cases, the executive officers have control over
compliance officers and receive their reports.160 This situation could lead
to a conflict of interest given that there are times when the compliance
officer’s position might contrast with the wishes or desired direction of
management, thereby resulting in intense pressures for the compliance
officer to succumb to the pressures of management to avoid threats to job
security. 161 In fact, various instances of compliance officers opting to

156. See Vishal Melwani, Refining Compliance Within Large Banking Organizations in a Post SR
08-8 World, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 615, 622 (2015) (discussing this potential conflict and
acknowledging the inherent contradiction it poses: “how can compliance staff be compensated if not
for the performance of the business line that contributes to the firm’s bottom line?”); Aruna
Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, Wall Street’s Hot Hire: Anti-Money Laundering Compliance
Officers, REUTERS FIN. REG. FORUM (Oct. 14, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatoryforum/2013/10/14/wall-streets-hot-hire-anti-money-laundering-compliance-officers/
[https://perma.cc/ZZ2S-WFPP] (discussing the rapid increase in compliance jobs and increased
compensation).
157. See Melwani, supra note 156, at 622–23 (noting that the data presented through this survey,
although differing depending on the compensation structure, revealed that on average incentive
compensation is typically 20% to 30% of base compensation but can even reach 100% of base
compensation).
158. See id. (noting that the data presented through this survey, although differing depending on
the compensation structure, revealed that on average incentive compensation is typically 20% to 30%
of base compensation but can even reach 100% of base compensation).
159 . See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 694 (2009).
160. Id. at 693.
161. Id. at 693–94.
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forego an investigation due to pressure from management have been
reported.162
B.

Inherent Tension Between Law Practice & Compliance Work

Given that the requirements of Rule 5.7 differ based on whether lawrelated services are being provided in circumstances that are distinct from
the lawyer’s provision of legal services, one way to minimize potential
liability is to clearly separate the legal and compliance departments within
an organization. There has been extensive scholarly debate as to whether
an organization’s legal and compliance functions should be
departmentalized, or operate as separate units, from each other.163 Various
corporate scandals occurring over the last two decades, and spanning
multiple industries, have prompted regulators to favor the separation of
the two functions.164 In particular, the SEC and the Department of Health
and Human Services have each required corporations that have engaged
in wrongdoing to both establish stand-alone compliance departments, and
appoint a chief compliance officer who reports directly to the board of
directors, rather than to the general counsel. 165 Regulators commonly
believe that a compliance department that is separate from the legal
function will allow more autonomy and independence to the former to
discover, report, and manage instances of non-compliance because
general counsel would not have a chance to filter or safeguard the
information before it reaches the board of directors. 166 This regulatory
preference towards separation of the two functions is also telling of the
inherent differences between a compliance officer and an attorney,
especially pertaining to the relationship of these individuals with the
organization itself and with regulators; in essence, the compliance officer
represents the regulator, rather than the organization that it monitors.167
162. Id. (also noting claims of compliance officers losing their jobs after deciding to resist orders
from management).
163 . See, e.g., DeStefano, supra note 8, at 124 (explaining the arguments for and against
departmentalization); Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers,
Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 500 (2012) (discussing the “robust
debate” as to whether compliance professionals should operate separately from legal counsel).
164. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 73–74 (noting that the trend of separating the two functions).
165. Id. at 74–75.
166. Id. at 124; see also Langevoort, supra note 163, at 500 (discussing how this influences
“professional competition” between lawyers and compliance officers). In addition, separation may
also allow the compliance industry as a whole to gain increased status in the corporate arena given
that it is not controlled by the legal function. See id.
167. See Fanto, supra note 104, at 5 (discussing the role of the compliance officer as guardians of
regulatory and other obligations who design policies and procedures to ensure that the organization
meets these external requirements).
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In society and in professional culture, lawyers tend to be perceived as
trusted, revered confidants and advisors offering a level of trust to clients
that would be unparalleled in other settings.168 This level of trust, inherent
in the various duties of loyalty and confidentiality that every attorney is
called to uphold, is likely to be in tension with that of the fundamental
role of a compliance officer, as compliance officers are commonly
perceived as either regulators themselves or as agents of regulators that
police entities to ensure rules are being followed. 169 In contrast, the
general counsel has a much more protective role over the organization and
is likely to have a more adversarial relationship with the regulator in
defending the entity against litigation or shielding it from liability. 170
Various scholars and practitioners have also noted the tendency to
perceive lawyers as possessing a certain “cast of mind” or exercising more
“strategy” than compliance officers so that the wishes of the client may
be followed, even if that may mean finding loopholes in the law. 171
Studies have revealed that lawyers, specifically when in charge of
compliance, are more likely than compliance officers “to lead their
organizations into a game-playing posture.”172 As one scholar put it, in
some cases, lawyers, particularly in-house counsel, may become subject
to a sort of “ethical numbing,” thereby leading the lawyer to adopt “the
same occupational morality as the managers with whom they work,

168. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1115, 1116 (2000) (noting that “basic principles of loyalty, competence and confidentiality” are
“defining principles for the practice of law [and] among the core values of the legal profession”);
State ex rel. S.G., 814 A.2d 612, 617 (N.J. 2003); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 SW.2d 543 (Tex.
1998) (each noting the almost sacred bond between attorney and client); Seth Rosner, The
Consigliere, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 191, 193 (1995) (describing a lawyer as “consigliere, or
counselor in the broadest professional sense,” the “old-fashioned . . . trusted advisor”); Edward J.
Greenfield, former Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, Letter to the Forum, Attorney
Professionalism Forum, 76 N.Y. ST. B. A. J., Jan. 2004, at 48 (2005) (noting that the lawyer’s position
is one “of trust as counsel, confidant, champion and fiduciary” (quoting Sanders v. Rosen, 605
N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1993)).
169. MILLER, supra note 28, at 130 (comparing a compliance officer to “a beat cop walking the
corridors of the company’s organization chart to ensure that rules and regulations are being
followed.”); see also DeStefano, supra note 8, at 122–23 (describing that proponents of
departmentalization have argued that doing so results in more independence and autonomy of the
compliance officer); McNeece, IV, supra note 154, at 677–78 (noting the inherent tensions in external
reporting that exist when the general counsel also serves as the compliance officer, the latter of which
has duties to report compliance obligations).
170. MILLER, supra note 28, at 127–28 (noting that, despite these differences, the general counsel
will usually still have input in a company’s response to the detection of a legal violation).
171. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 135–36.
172. See Christine E. Parker et al., The Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business
Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201, 239–40 (2009).
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because they are subject to the same social exigencies, power struggles,
personal uncertainties and demands of expediency that characterize the
corporate bureaucratic organization.”173 In-house counsel are often faced
with strong pressures to follow the wishes of management—their refusal
to do so may compromise not only their standing within the organization,
but also their job security.174 As such, they are susceptible to retaliation in
much the same way as employees are for insubordination, and there have
been numerous instances of retaliation cases occurring against counsel for
refusing to follow the wishes of management.175
While such perceptions cannot and should not be used to generalize all
attorneys, they do raise concerns that are more likely to be associated with
the tensions that exist when an entity’s general counsel is simultaneously
wearing the hat of chief compliance officer, as opposed to a non-lawyer
acting solely in a compliance role. Senator Chuck Grassley, while leading
a committee to investigate a large-scale fraud within Tenet Healthcare
Corporation, one of the largest hospital operators in the country, publicly
“blasted” the corporation’s joint general counsel and chief compliance
officer in 2003 for the inherent conflict of interest that allegedly rendered
her unable to prevent the scandal.176 He expressed that:
[A]s general counsel, [she] zealously defended [the corporation]
against claims of ethical and legal non-compliance . . . while as
chief compliance officer, she supposedly ensured compliance by
[the corporation’s] officers, directors, and employees. . . . [I]t
doesn’t take a pig farmer from Iowa to smell the stench of conflict
in that arrangement.177

173. Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L. REV. 867, 879–80 (2004); see also
Greg Radinsky, The Compliance Officer Conundrum: Assessing Privilege Issues in a Health Care
Setting, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 3 (2002) (“[T]he dual roles [of general counsel/CO] will
make it difficult for the corporate counsel to maintain objectivity when providing advice about the
deficiencies of the compliance program he/she oversees.”).
174. Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of
Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 246–47 (2016).
175. See, e.g., Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1043, 1083–86 (2008) (discussing numerous cases of attorneys who were
retaliated against for reporting misconduct, either internally or externally or resisting management);
Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Resituating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 983, 1005–06 (2005) (discussing the prevalence of retaliation against in-house counsel).
176. Charles E. Grassley, Grassley Investigates Tenet Healthcare’s Use of Federal Tax Dollars, CHUCK
GRASSLEY, U.S. SEN. FOR IOWA (Sept. 7, 2003), https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/newsreleases/grassley-investigates-tenet-healthcares-use-federal-tax-dollars [https://perma.cc/LSU7-ASW9].
177. Martin, supra note 29, at 170 (internal citations omitted); see also Hutchens, supra note 5, at
67 (noting that when counsel also wears the hat of compliance officer, it “can become a
nightmare. . . .”).
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In contrast to the general counsel’s role, the compliance function, in its
most fundamental form, is centered around “neutral fact finding,” the
detection and prevention of misconduct, and assurance that the
organization operates to facilitate the best interests of all stakeholders, all
of which involve not just the constituents of an organization but also
internal and external parties.178 In this way, it has been argued that the
compliance function is often more focused on the question of whether
entities “should” take some action, as opposed to the legal department
historically being sometimes more focused on whether entities “can do
something.” 179 Additionally, the compliance function also involves
characteristics that extend beyond legal capabilities into expertise in
management, training, human resource issues, auditing, communications,
and internal controls.180 Despite these inherent differences between the
compliance and legal functions, it is widely acknowledged that the two
are nevertheless jointly responsible for an entity’s overall adherence to the
law and regulatory landscape and that thus, even if they are housed in
separate units, they must be in communication with each other and have
a good working relationship.181 A healthy partnership between the legal
and compliance functions helps to ensure a culture of integrity that is
centered on honesty, fairness, and other crucial values that facilitate
effective governance.182
Despite the need for a collaborative partnership in this manner, lawyers
within the compliance function should also be mindful of the risk of
liability by regulatory agencies that may seek to hold them personally
responsible for the compliance failures of their respective organizations.
Recently, the SEC has expressed an interest in imposing liability against
in-house counsel and lawyers who carry out gatekeeping roles.183 One
such threat involves requiring lawyers to “take ownership of violations”
178. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 148 (emphasis omitted) (citing interviews with chief compliance
officers, including individuals who formerly practiced law, as to the important distinctions between
the legal and compliance functions); see also Tabuena & Smith, supra note 5, at 25–26.
179. DeStefano, supra note 8, at 148–49 (emphasis added).
180. Tabuena & Smith, supra note 5, at 26; see also Roy Snell, Having an Effective Compliance
Program Is Not About Being Perfect Seasoned Compliance Leader Discusses Program Effectiveness
Evaluations, 17 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 37, 66 (2015) (discussing the various skills and traits
of effective compliance officers).
181. See, e.g., Bird & Park, supra note 174, at 203–05 (discussing the contributions of the Chief Legal
Officer to the corporate compliance function); Martin, supra note 29, at 184 (noting that practitioners
have expressed the importance of coordinating legal and compliance functions); David B. Wilkins, Team
of Rivals—Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2067, 2131–32 (2010) (discussing the interplay between the legal and compliance functions).
182. Bird & Park, supra note 174, at 236–38.
183. See Eric Hammesfahr, SEC’s Stein Suggests Attorneys Sign Disclosures, CQ ROLL CALL,
2014 WL 2119345 (2014) (discussing SEC attempts to impose liability).
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by including statements and a signature attesting to the accuracy of
clients’ disclosure statements in SEC filings, a requirement that has
previously been designated only to chief financial officers under SOX.184
Stating that “[n]othing focuses the mind like signing your own name,”
SEC staff have expressed the agency’s desire to hold attorneys in
compliance roles just as liable as other gatekeepers like accountants and
auditors, without hiding behind the attorney-client privilege, given their
involvement in “getting corporations to follow the law in completing
disclosure documents.” 185 One SEC staff member in particular has
expressed concern that the attorney-client privilege may have the effect of
shielding lawyers in compliance roles from responsibility for their
company’s violations and that they should arguably face the same kind of
scrutiny as other gatekeepers, given their role in providing advice on
corporate transactions and reviewing disclosures.186
Traditionally, the organized bar has heavily resisted government efforts
to impose responsibility upon lawyers to ensure their clients’ compliance
with the law.187 In 1975, the ABA expressed that this type of imposition
would “evoke serious and far-reaching disruption in the role of the lawyer
as counselor, which would be detrimental to the public, clients, and the
legal profession.”188 This line of thinking is based on the more traditional
“moral independence” or “non-accountability” theory of lawyering,
which takes the view that lawyers are “independent” from their clients and
thus cannot be morally responsible for the wrongs that their clients
commit. 189 This theory, however, is no longer adequate to reflect the
184. Id. (noting the desire of the SEC to impose liability in this manner); see 18 U.S.C. § 1350(b)
(2018) (requiring principal executives and financial officers of public companies to certify the
accuracy of their company’s financial statements).
185. Hammesfahr, supra note 183.
186. Id. (“When lawyers provide bad advice or effectively assist in a fraud, sometimes their
involvement is used as a shield against liability for both themselves and for others.” (citing
Commissioner Kara M. Stein)). Stein also asked the question “Are we treating lawyers differently
from other gatekeepers, such as accountants?” Id.; see also Frank C. Razzano, Is the SEC Targeting
Lawyers?, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 1, 1 (noting the uptick in the SEC targeting lawyers for violations of
gatekeeping duties); Dylan L. Ruffi, Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Administration: A New
Approach, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 640, 640 (2015) (discussing the “burgeoning concern”
in the modern corporate world that lawyers who provide dual legal and non-legal roles will “use their
dual roles as shields against discovery—invoking attorney-client privilege to immunize otherwise
unprotected communications.”).
187. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67
S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 558–59 (1994).
188 . Id. (citing ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, SECTION ON CORPORATION,
BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW (1975)).
189. See Michal McGinniss, Virtue and Advice: Socratic Perspectives on Lawyer Independence
and Moral Counseling of Clients, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 8 (2013) (describing the moral
independence theory as “[a] deep-seated yet controversial precept of our legal system”); see also
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compliance and gatekeeping roles that many attorneys play in modern
society, which embody an important public interest role that strays from
traditional definitions of the practice of law centered on litigation,
advocacy, and representation in an adversarial setting. As Richard Painter
has discussed, a model more appropriate to modern day attorney-client
interactions may be described as a “moral interdependence theory” in
which it is acknowledged that “[o]ften, lawyers and clients accomplish
objectives together, not separately.”190
Lawyers representing clients in transactional, regulatory, and
compliance contexts have different responsibilities than those
representing clients in criminal or tort contexts. The latter requires the
attorney to represent a client who may have committed a crime or tort and
seeks the help of a lawyer to represent them through the adversarial
process—in this instance, the attorney is clearly not liable for the client’s
crime or tort. In contrast, lawyers representing clients in transactional,
regulatory, and compliance contexts are often advising clients on legal
and ethical actions to be taken, are more intimately engaged with day-today corporate behavior, and play a substantial role in what information
the client ultimately decides to self-report or disclose in a public filing.191
“When lawyers monitor disclosure of information to regulators and
investors . . . lawyers assume some responsibility for the flow of accurate
information. A litigator’s responsibility for the integrity of the adversary
system is not the issue; a corporate lawyer’s responsibility for the integrity
of the financial markets is.”192
Thus, even if lawyers have attempted to establish independence from
clients by objecting to wrongful conduct, that conduct may be said to be
“imposed by the client upon a compliance or transactional framework
designed by the lawyer and so contaminates the framework such that the
lawyer has an obligation to repudiate it in its entirety.” 193 This risk is
particularly relevant to a compliance officer, who is directly involved in
establishing frameworks, mechanisms, policies, and procedures to ensure
adherence of the organization to the rules and regulations that govern its
behavior. For these reasons, it is crucial that the ethical rules governing
the behavior of lawyers, especially as they pertain to those functioning as
compliance officers who are not practicing law, provide with absolute
clarity the extent to which they are obligated, if at all, to provide the

Painter, supra note 187, at 511–16 (discussing the limitations of this theory).
190. Painter, supra note 187, at 511 (emphasis added).
191. See id. at 508.
192. Id. at 570.
193. Id.

15 Pacella.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/31/20 12:08 AM

THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN COMPLIANCE

987

organizational client with all of the coveted characteristics that are typical
of the attorney-client relationship.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
To better regulate the professional behavior of lawyers engaged in
compliance roles, Rule 5.7 is in need of reform. There is sufficient
evidence that state bars and courts actively enforce Rule 5.7. Various
courts have disciplined or excluded from representation a number of
lawyers for violations of the rule.194 In addition, numerous state bars have
issued ethics opinions, both generally and in response to inquiries, that
highlight the existence of Rule 5.7 in their jurisdictions and clarify that
enforcement of the rule will be upheld in situations in which admitted
attorneys provide law-related services in conjunction with their legal
services.195 Some of the most recent ethics opinions in this context have
found that adherence to all of the rules of professional conduct would be
necessary when the following non-legal services are being provided:
accounting services that substantially overlapped with legal services;
instances in which a licensed attorney was acting as a real estate agent
under a broker’s supervision; the management by lawyers of a for-profit
adoption agency; the provision of mediation services; when former judges
engage in law-related businesses; an investment match-making service in
which lawyers introduced potential investors to clients in search of capital
for start-up businesses; and the provision of lien search services through
a law firm’s own employees.196
This insight from bar associations and courts indicates that enforcement
of Rule 5.7 likely also applies against compliance officers who are
admitted attorneys, given that their work can be described as a law-related
194. Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 301 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tenn. 2010); In re Peper, 763
S.E.2d 205, 209 (S.C. 2014); In re Disciplinary Action Fraley, 709 N.W.2d 624, 625 (Minn. 2006); In
re Rost, 211 P.3d 145, 156 (Kan. 2009); In re Guste, 118 So. 3d 1023 (La. 2012) (imposing
disciplinary actions on an attorney for violations of Rule 5.7); In re Disciplinary Action Against
McCray, 755 N.W.2d 835 (N.D. 2008) (imposing disciplinary actions on an attorney for violations of
Rule 5.7); see also Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and Ethical Implications
of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 390 (2005) (noting
that various courts have disciplined lawyers providing “law-related services” for violating Rule 5.7).
195. A search on Westlaw on the existence of state bar ethics opinions covering Rule 5.7 yielded
sixty-six results. See, e.g., N.Y. BAR. ASS’N. COMM. PROF’L. ETHICS, N.Y. Ethics Op. 1135 (2017)
(clarifying that Rule 5.7 will be enforced by the jurisdiction); UTAH BAR ETHICS ADVISORY OP.
COMM., Utah Ethics Op. 17-07 (2017) (same); N.C. BAR, N.C. Ethics Op. 10 (2015) (same); N.Y.
BAR. ASS’N. COMM. PROF’L. ETHICS, N.Y. Ethics Op. 1026 (2014) (same); OHIO BD. COMM’RS. ON
GRIEVANCE & DISCIPLINE, Ohio Advisory Op. 2013-3 (2013) (same); N.Y. BAR. ASS’N. COMM.
PROF’L. ETHICS, N.Y. Ethics Op. 958 (2013) (same); N.Y. BAR. ASS’N. COMM. PROF’L. ETHICS, N.Y.
Ethics Op. 896 (2011) (same).
196. See supra state bar ethics opinions accompanying note 195, respectively.
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service subject to the rule. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Kansas
disbarred a retired attorney on inactive status who continued to “practice
law” by providing legal advice to clients, appearing in court with clients,
and splitting fees with another attorney on client matters.197 While these
actions alone constituted the unauthorized practice of law, the court also
found that the attorney had violated Rule 5.7 by operating a consulting
business in which he rendered business advice and accounting services to
his clients, which were deemed to be law-related services warranting
reasonable measures to inform clients that a lawyer-client relationship had
not been established for those services. 198 In failing to provide such
disclosures, the lawyer had violated the rule; “[t]he principal culprit is the
possibility that the person for whom the law-related services are
performed fails to understand that the services may not carry with them
the protections normally afforded as part of the clientlawyer relationship.”199
The Supreme Court of Louisiana suspended an attorney for charging a
client an excessive fee in violation of the state’s rules of professional
conduct. 200 In that case, the attorney had represented a nursing home
resident in both the preparation of a power of attorney and a criminal
proceeding arising from a hit and run accident. 201 When these legal
services ended, the attorney continued to assist the client with duties like
taking him to the bank and running other personal errands with him, for
which she charged him her hourly fee as an attorney. 202 The attorney
testified that “during her six-month relationship with [the client], he
frequently told her that he ‘wanted an attorney’ on a full-time basis and
that because of her legal training, he trusted her to handle his affairs.”203
The court concluded that the client “came to rely upon [the respondent]
because of her position as a lawyer and that this confidence did not
dissipate simply because she had concluded a court case.”204 The court
went on to explain that this kind of “blur[ring of] the line[s]” between
legal and non-legal services made it impossible to “draw any line of
demarcation” between the two, and so treated all of her fees as legal
fees.205 However, because the court still recognized that the attorney had
197. In re Rost, 211 P.3d at 146–55.
198. Id. at 156–58.
199. Id. at 156.
200. In re Guste, 118 So. 3d 1023, 1032 (La. 2012).
201. Id. at 1025.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1031.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1031–33.
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charged her client for time as a lawyer while she was providing non-legal
services, her fee was determined to be excessive and she was suspended
from practice for two years.206
In one case interpreting New York’s Rule 5.7 (known as Disciplinary
Rule 1-106 at the time), an attorney was disqualified when he was found
to have a conflict of interest in representing a plaintiff who was suing a
school that allegedly discriminated against her. 207 The attorney had
previously provided non-legal auditing services for the school that was
being sued, during which time he obtained confidential information about
the school. 208 A dispute existed in that case as to whether the precise
nature of the work that the attorney had provided to the school was legal
in nature. Without resolving that exact question, the court upheld the
presumption that an attorney-client relationship had been formed since it
was not demonstrated that the client reasonably believed otherwise. 209
There was no evidence that the lawyer had exercised his disclosure option
to inform the school in advance that legal services were not being
rendered.210
Each of these cases offers a fitting example of the perils of nondisclosure and exemplifies that, in situations where the non-legal work
may be reasonably interpreted to have legal components, there is a strong
likelihood that the client will believe that an attorney-client relationship
is in place. This likelihood is strongest in organizations comprising both
lawyers and non-lawyers who are engaged in a common goal. For
example,
[w]hile a non-lawyer would immediately understand that a law
graduate who owns and operates a craft brewery is not providing
“law-related services,” the distinction might not be so clear if an
attorney is part-owner of a lobbying firm that includes both
lawyer and non-lawyer lobbyists, a patent firm with both
attorneys and non-lawyer patent agents, or a tax consulting
service employing lawyers, accountants, and tax advisors who
are neither.211
In much the same way, constituents of an organization—whether they
be directors, officers, managers or employees—are likely to be
susceptible to confusion if their compliance officer is either wearing the
206. Id.
207. Ehrich v. Binghamton City Sch. Dist., 210 F.R.D. 17, 18–19 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 2002).
208. Id. at 19.
209. Id. at 23.
210. Id.
211. Spitzer, supra note 20, at 55.
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dual hat of general counsel or, even if not in that role, is simply a lawyer
by training.212 There is evidence that this risk is especially significant in
the compliance context. Some general counsels overseeing compliance
have noted a frequent perception that:
There is NO such thing as a non-practicing lawyer—purely
practical—if you are a lawyer, you are a lawyer. It doesn’t matter
if you are licensed to practice law or not. People look at you as a
lawyer and rely on you as it and believe you dispense legal advice
despite [your] title.213
As this statement supports, lawyers do tend to embody a certain
“degree of gravitas” within organizational settings, generally prompting
individuals within an organization to respond more quickly and
comprehensively to their requests or inquiries for information.214
While the potential for confusion as to whether an attorney-client
relationship exists is high in a compliance context, it is not isolated to it—
in actuality, it commonly occurs whenever various law-related services
are being provided, whether involving trust officers interacting with bank
customers, real estate attorneys providing title insurance, or any of the
other scenarios contemplated by Rule 5.7 that are deemed to be lawrelated services. 215 For these reasons, Rule 5.7 should be amended to
incorporate the preventative disclosure obligation that is currently
contained in the versions of Rule 5.7 adopted by New York, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania.
While some may perhaps view a disclosure obligation of this nature as
an additional burden for attorneys, the benefits far outweigh the relatively
small costs of taking these preemptive steps because they would offer a
mechanism for the attorney to avoid being bound to the full spectrum of
ethical rules while conducting compliance-only services. In addition,
recipients of law-related services would be clearly informed from the
beginning as to the exact nature of their relationship with the lawyer.
Subsection (2) of Rule 5.7 contains an “out” for lawyers providing lawrelated services to avoid being held to all of the other rules if they “take
reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related
212. Remus, supra note 2, at 1280 (noting that “confusion [pertaining to whether a lawyer-client
relationship has been formed] frequently surrounds” interactions between an attorney not practicing
law within an organization and the individuals within the entity).
213 . DeStefano, supra note 8, at 137 (quoting various interviewees holding joint general
counsel/compliance positions).
214. MILLER, supra note 28, at 193.
215. See, e.g., Andrew M. Goldner, Minding Someone Else’s Businesses: Pennsylvania Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.7 Leads the Way, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 767, 772 (1998) (same); Remus,
supra note 2, at 1280 (discussing the types of law-related services currently contemplated by the rule).
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services knows that the services are not legal services and that the
protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.” 216 As noted,
subsection (2) also refers to “entities” controlled by lawyers and fails to
explicitly include individual lawyers who may be employees of an
organization as being able to avail themselves of this option.217 Although,
as discussed, this subsection is intended to capture all other circumstances
not covered by subsection (1),218 the potential for confusion remains as to
whether a lawyer who does not “control” an entity may utilize the
“reasonable measures” out given the lack of explicit mention in the rule.
Clarity to this language would ensure that compliance officers, who are
employees of the organizations that they monitor, 219 would not be
excluded from the rule’s protective disclosure option.
An additional problem with Rule 5.7 is that subsection (2)’s use of the
term “reasonable measures” is fraught with great potential for confusion
due to its lack of specificity. Neither Rule 5.7 nor the commentary thereto
explains what constitutes a reasonable measure that would sufficiently
ensure that the lawyer has successfully avoided application of all of the
rules.220 Comment 7 to the rule explains that “[t]he burden is upon the
lawyer to show that the lawyer has taken reasonable measures under the
circumstances to communicate the desired understanding.” 221 It then
proceeds to note that what satisfies the threshold of “reasonable measures”
will differ depending on the “sophisticat[ion] [of the] user of law-related
services”; “[f]or instance, a sophisticated user of law-related services,
such as a publicly held corporation, may require a lesser explanation than
someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and
law-related services, such as an individual seeking tax advice from a
lawyer-accountant or investigative services in connection with
a lawsuit.”222
In the context of compliance services, judging the sophistication of the
recipient of the law-related services is likely to be quite a challenge given
that such persons would consist of various identifiable constituents,
whether employees of any level, members of the management team, the
board of directors, or other lawyers working in the compliance
216. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis added).
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 114–123, 134–135 and accompanying text.
219 . Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson, supra note 39, at 108 (“[C]ompliance officers are
employees of the company they monitor and audit.”).
220 . See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 5.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (lacking such
explanations).
221. Id. cmt. 7.
222. Id.
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department—each of whom obviously possesses a differing level of
comprehension as to the extent to which legal services are distinct from
law-related services. 223 Therefore, it is important that a lawyer’s
preventative disclosure be communicated in a consistent manner to any
and all persons who may be receiving the services.
Model Rule 1.13, discussed in Part I of this article, which governs the
behavior of attorneys when they are representing organizations as clients,
also offers helpful guidance in shaping a disclosure requirement for
incorporation in Rule 5.7. Model Rule 1.13 contains a reporting obligation
that requires a lawyer who represents an organization to explain to the
various constituents of the organization the boundaries of the attorneyclient relationship.224 Subsection (f) of Model Rule 1.13 reads as follows:
“[i]n dealing with an organization’s directors, officers, employees,
members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the
identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents
with whom the lawyer is dealing.”225 In practice, these requirements are
arguably comparable to Upjohn warnings, which require in-house counsel
to warn employees interviewed during internal investigations in advance
that the interview is subject to the attorney-client privilege only between
the company and the lawyer, given that the lawyer represents the company
only, and that the company may opt to waive the privilege and disclose
the employees’ communications with the lawyer to third parties.226 In this
way, employees are then alerted to exercise caution, if they so choose, in
their communications to the lawyer.
In a similar way, the constituents of an organization regularly
interacting with lawyer/compliance officers, including the organization’s
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents (as the language of Model Rule 1.13 captures), should be
made aware of the precise boundaries of the work being rendered and
which of those services would trigger the protections of the attorney-client
relationship. As examined earlier, Model Rule 1.13 requires lawyers
representing organizations to report violations of the law likely “to result
in substantial injury to the organization” to its “highest authority” (the
board of directors or board of trustees); if the board fails to address the
223. See L.T. Lafferty, The Habits of Highly Effective Compliance Officers from Effectiveness to
Greatness in Your Program Activities, 12 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 11, 15 (2010) (discussing
the various types of individuals within an entity with whom the compliance officer has daily contact
and interactions).
224. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
225. Id.
226. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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concern or allows it to proceed, lawyers who “reasonably believe
necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization” may opt to
make an external report of the violation without obtaining client consent
and without violating the duty of confidentiality.227
The unique considerations that emerge when a lawyer is representing
an organization are also relevant to the lawyer serving as a compliance
officer for an entity—in both cases, the recipient of the lawyer’s services
is not an individual person, but rather an organization comprised of
various individuals. In such instances, it becomes possible that one
category of constituents may have interests that are adverse to that of the
organization, such as, for example, in the case of officers or other
executives committing wrongdoing that ultimately harms the
organization. 228 Therefore, a reporting requirement, when provided
through advance written notice, could significantly reduce the potential
for confusion regarding a compliance lawyer’s duties. In light of these
considerations, the language of Rule 5.7 should be amended to adopt the
bolded language below or a similar variation thereof. Paragraph (b) of the
rule should remain unchanged.229
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct
with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in
paragraph (b),230 if the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the
lawyer’s provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) in other circumstances by the lawyer or by an entity
controlled by the lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer
fails to inform the person receiving the services, or, in the case
of an organization, its duly authorized constituents, in writing
that the services are not legal services and that the protections
of a client-lawyer relationship do not exist with respect to the
law-related services.
This proposed language incorporates both the heightened disclosure
obligations of Rule 5.7 adopted by New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio231
227. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b), (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
228. See supra notes 172–175.
229. Paragraph (b) of Model Rule 5.7 currently reads as follows: “[t]he term ‘law-related services’
denotes services that might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related
to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when
provided by a non-lawyer.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
230. See id.
231. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (a)(4), which establishes a presumption that the
recipient of the non-legal services “believes the services to be the subject of a client-lawyer
relationship unless the lawyer or law firm has advised the person receiving the services in writing that
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and the pertinent organizational-related concerns that are highlighted in
Model Rule 1.13. 232 These amendments would clearly inform the
recipient of the services in a writing (which would document the
communication for later reference) that the coveted characteristics of an
attorney-client relationship, like confidentiality and conflict of interest
concerns, would not come into play.
In addition, a minor change to Comment 9 of Model Rule 5.7 is
warranted. This Comment currently enumerates that the various lawrelated services that the ABA has noted serve “a broad range of economic
and other interests of clients” and trigger adherence to Rule 5.7.233 As
previously stated, these include “providing title insurance, financial
planning, accounting, trust services, real estate counseling, legislative
lobbying, economic analysis, social work, psychological counseling, tax
preparation, and patent, medical or environmental consulting.” 234 To
properly reflect the popularity of compliance as an employment option for
lawyers, the position of “compliance officer” or “compliance services”
should also be added to this list. By doing so, any and all confusion may
be eliminated as to whether compliance constitutes a law-related service.
These changes to Model Rule 5.7 provide the type of guidance that is
warranted to regulate lawyers in modern-day non-legal or law-related
fields and would serve as a model for state adoption to help the increasing
number of lawyers engaged in the compliance function ensure that they
are properly following the rules that govern their professional duties.
CONCLUSION
The field of compliance has developed by leaps and bounds in recent
decades, thereby giving rise to numerous employment opportunities that
lawyers have increasingly filled. As a “J.D. Advantage” job, lawyers
make valuable contributions to the compliance function by applying their
skills and expertise in the interpretation and analysis of regulations, rules,
and statutes across various industries.235 Despite the notable increase in
law graduates and experienced attorneys working as compliance officers
or within compliance departments, the regulation of lawyers in this space
has failed to keep pace with these realities. The inefficiencies of the
the services are not legal services and that the protection of a client-lawyer relationship does not exist
with respect to the non-legal services.” See also OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 (b)–(c); PA.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7(d).
232. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
233. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.7 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
234. Id.
235. See supra section I.A.
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existing regulatory model that governs lawyers when acting in a non-legal
role, such as compliance, give rise to the potential for heightened liability
because lawyers must ensure that they are following and fulfilling their
ethical duties, even in duties that do not constitute law practice.236
The ABA’s Model Rule 5.7, which requires lawyers to follow the full
panoply of ethical rules when they are providing non-legal, “law-related
services” is on point for the compliance function, which encompasses the
exact circumstances in which this rule would be triggered.237 This Article
closely examines this rule and highlights adoptions of the rule that have
more successfully articulated the specific responsibilities of lawyers
engaged in law-related services. It concludes by proposing reform to Rule
5.7 focused on heightened disclosure obligations that would help navigate
the murky boundaries between the legal and compliance functions and
ensure that the recipient of the lawyer’s services is fully aware of the
extent to which the protections of the attorney-client relationship may or
may not apply. Such amendments would better protect the unique
vulnerabilities that have emerged for lawyers in compliance as they
facilitate and promote the public interest goal that is so fundamental to the
compliance function.

236. See supra Part III.
237. See supra section II.A.

